


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# ***JPRS Report***



## **Near East & South Asia**

***REGIONAL AFFAIRS***

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## Gulf Leftists Call for Democracy, U.S. Ouster

91AE0498A Cairo AL-YASAR in Arabic  
10 Jun 91 pp 22-23

[Article: "Gulf Leftist Parties Demand Democracy, Elimination of U.S. Presence, Adherence to Arab Affiliation"]

[Text] Five parties and party organizations in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman have issued an important statement about current conditions in Kuwait. The following is its text:

The Gulf region is witnessing unprecedented diplomatic activity, with the defense and foreign ministers of the United States and its allies paying visits to arrange postwar conditions.

American Secretary of Defense Cheney's recent visit comes as the most prominent event in this area. Following it, he announced agreement with the six Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] countries to establish a regional security system based on a joint defense between these countries and the United States. It would involve secret agreements assuring the United States military bases, weapons arsenals, a forward command center on GCC territory, a huge naval presence, and a commitment by these countries to conclude weapons deals with the United States.

As the leaders of the GCC countries express their great enthusiasm for America's feverish activity in the area, they are turning their backs on the Damascus declaration, whose ink has not yet dried, and abandoning the Arab solidarity effectively shown by some Arab countries during the ordeal of the occupation of Kuwait. They are withdrawing from commitments to establish a true comprehensive security system in the region—one whose nucleus would be constituted by this declaration and that would be based on the Arab League charter and the joint Arab defense treaty.

Kuwait was liberated from occupation by virtue of the world's consensus embodied in international law through Security Council and United Nations resolutions. However, under this cover the United States worked fearful destruction in Iraq, culminating in direct military occupation of the region. The United States intends to perpetuate this occupation in violation of its promises and Security Council resolutions, which call for coalition forces to withdraw from the region, leaving the region's peoples to decide what regional political and security system they want.

The continued presence of foreign forces on our soil and in our waters threatens to do away with the independence of our countries and is returning us to the age of direct colonialism. Exploiting the occupation of our region by its forces, the United States has already begun to impose its dictates. It has forced Kuwait and other countries to restrict the awarding of contracts to rebuild and arm the region basically to the United States.

The fact is that the United States, having gained a free hand in the world, is trying to order the world's affairs by itself. It is trying to make its allies submit to its private strategy, beginning with the exceedingly sensitive Gulf region. This demonstrates the features of America's vision of a new world order—a vision based on concern only for American interests, a return to a policy of bases and military pacts, troop deployments, secret agreements, and supporting or imposing regimes that carry out and implement this policy against the interests and will of the people. What the Gulf region is now witnessing is the best example of this American vision. The United States is assuming responsibility for the political survival of backward GCC regimes based on absence of democracy, hostility to democracy, and violation of human rights.

The various activities we are now witnessing by the United States and other Western countries mean that they have jettisoned promises given before and during the war about the importance of democracy and respect for human rights as a guarantee of stability and defense against the dangers encircling the area. They no longer voice the charges they once justifiably leveled against the authoritarianism and archaic nature of these regimes.

The Americans and Westerners must stop following this policy, if they want peace and stability to dominate the region and the world.

Unlike their rulers, our peoples have deduced hard, necessary lessons from their recent tragedy. The most important of these is that foreign protection, monetary wealth, and tutelage of rulers, along with disregard of the Arabs, have not and will not be able to spare us similar tragedies in the future.

Because in the past all this took place behind their backs, the masses are now voicing insistent demands for democratic freedoms, respect for human rights, and the restoration or establishment of modern constitutions that guarantee the people their role in protecting themselves, their countries, and their future. The shared suffering of the occupation of Kuwait has taught them the importance of struggle to speed Gulf unity based on the will of the people and democratic foundations. Having seen the dangers that threatened their identity and existence in turning away from sister Arab countries, they are holding fast to their Arab affiliation and struggling for closer relations with Arab brothers. They are struggling to utilize Arab material, financial, and human resources to further our development and common destiny on the path to unity. They want united efforts to solve complex major problems justly and permanently, especially the issue of the Palestinian Arab people, with their right to return, determine their destiny, and establish their independent state on their land under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole legitimate representative. They want pressure on the countries of the world to apply the United Nations resolutions on this subject with the same will with which they were applied regarding the Gulf crisis.



They have learned from the tragedy of Kuwait the importance of establishing a comprehensive security system in the region, based on the will of the region's people and countries and implemented by them in the face of foreign ambitions.

The region's rulers should learn from the lessons of the past. They should hearken to the call of the age and to the people's desire to be given their right to political participation to shape stable domestic conditions impervious to damage by shocks. The people want the wealth of the region to serve its peaceful development and to be material for constructive mutual cooperation between our countries and all peoples and countries of the world.

As we affirm our stand with the Kuwaiti people and their national movement in their struggle to apply the 1962 constitution and realize democracy and respect for personal freedoms and human rights in Kuwait, we call on international and Arab public opinion to stand with the peoples of the GCC countries in their struggle for democracy, government by institutions and law, respect for human rights, elimination of foreign military presence, and conversion of the Gulf region into a region of peace.

And we hope that the fraternal Iraqi people, with its Arabs, Kurds, and minorities, will free itself from the terrible tragedies it is suffering by establishing a democratic alternative and a national, democratic government that will rescue the Iraqi people forever from suffering and despotism and bring them progress and prosperity under democracy, political pluralism, and respect for human rights.

Bahraini National Liberation Front

Communist Party in Saudi Arabia

Popular Union Party in Kuwait

Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman

Popular Front in Bahrain

### **Iranian Charge in Cairo on Iraq, Regional Security**

91AA0490A *Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic* 26 Jun 91 p 2

[Interview with 'Ali Asghar Mohammadi Sijabi by Jamal-al-Din Husayn: "We Support Iraq's Unity and Sovereignty and Reject Intervention in Its Affairs"; in Cairo, date not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] AL-AHALI met with Mr. 'Ali Asghar Mohammadi Sijabi, Iranian charge d'affaires to Cairo, following the agreement to resume relations between the two countries. This interview dealt with regional security and Iran's position on certain issues.

[Husayn] What is the Iranian Islamic Republic's position on the so-called security arrangements in the Gulf?

[Sijabi] The Iranian Islamic Republic, as the largest country overlooking the Persian Gulf, believes that Gulf

security is important and is the responsibility of the indigenous population. It also believes that the indigenous population is capable of safeguarding their security, and we vehemently oppose the presence of American and NATO troops as part of the region's security arrangements.

[Husayn] How does the Iranian Islamic Republic view its current relations with Iraq?

[Sijabi] In principle, we support Iraq's unity and territorial sovereignty and believe that the Iraqi people are the only ones who can determine their destiny. We supported the Iraqi people during the last war in the Persian Gulf and offered medical and food assistance to Iraqi citizens.

The Iranian Islamic Republic believes that the Iraqi regime must not use repressive measures against the Iraqi people. We will not interfere in Iraq's internal affairs, and there should not be any kind of intervention in Iraq's international affairs by any other powers.

[Husayn] The current Iranian leadership, represented by President 'Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani, is portrayed as a "pragmatic political" leadership. Given this portrayal, is it possible to establish diplomatic relations between the Iranian Islamic Republic and each of the United States—which you call the "great Satan"—and Israel and South Africa?

[Sijabi] I believe that such a portrayal is an attempt to justify past ill-conceived dealings with the Islamic revolution on the part of may foreign powers.

The leadership, the Islamic Republic's leadership, is following the same course followed after the Islamic revolution's victory. Many people, however, did not want to understand the reality and prudent leadership of a revolution that was aware of the perils threatening the region, as represented by the Iranian leadership's expansionist concept.

As for Israel, it is an entity which usurped Arab and Islamic land in Palestine and must be wiped out of existence. This has been a fundamental position of the Iranian revolution before and after its triumph.

With regard to South Africa, so long as the policy of apartheid is observed there, the establishment of relations is out of the question.

With respect to America, it is still the big satan and must change its approach in dealing with the Islamic revolution and the Iranian Islamic Republic.

### **Arab League Has Trouble Collecting Dues**

91AA0513A *London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic* 8 Jul 91 p 4

[Article by Suzi al-Junaydi]

[Text] Cairo—Following the Gulf crisis, numerous statements have been made attacking the Arab League and its



role in the crisis. Some of the Arab states accused it of negativism and weakness. Unfortunately these accusations are being loudly reiterated, demanding that the League's charter and system should be changed. But the question is: Have the member states fulfilled their obligations towards the Arab League before they demand their rights from it?

Have the Arab states contributed materially, politically, or morally to the strengthening of the Arab League?

We find the answer to this in the reality of its situation. The Arab League is currently facing a financial crisis; it does not have enough cash to pay the salaries of its staff due to the fact that for many years most of the Arab states have not been paying their dues, with default on payments sometimes going back to 13 years prior to the Gulf crisis.

Arab League political sources told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that Arab League Secretary General 'Isamat 'Abd-al-Majid's earlier tour of the Gulf states and his coming tour of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan focus on two basic issues. These are: clearing the Arab skies and urging all the Arab states to pay their dues to the Arab League in full. Debts owed by some of these states have reached \$60 million, consequently the League is finding difficulty in paying the salaries of its staff.

Next month Dr. 'Abd-al-Majid is scheduled to make a tour of the Arab Maghreb countries for the same purpose and a final tour of the remaining Arab countries, namely Sudan, Djibouti, and Yemen.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that only four Arab countries have paid their dues in full to the Arab League's budget, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], Bahrain, and Oman. Egypt will pay its dues during this month. The Arab League is facing a financial crisis after its treasury has become completely empty because of the failure of some of the Arab states to pay their dues for many years, with some Arab countries having not paid for 10 years.

Some of the Arab countries attribute their failure to pay their dues to their difficult economic conditions, although these countries never delay the payment of their dues to the United Nations. Some of the Arab countries committed to the League are considering the application of article 15 of the League's bylaws which were unanimously endorsed by resolution number 3058 of 24 July 1973, which provides that a member state may not take part in voting if the total of money it owes to the League's budget exceeds its dues for the current fiscal year and the two years immediately preceding it.

An Arab League political source says that if this article were to be implemented, then only five or six Arab states out of 21 will have the right to vote.

All the Arab states must believe in the Arab League's objectives, strengthen it, implement its resolutions, and pay what they owe to the Arab League's budget if they

wish the League to play its role successfully in serving objectives of joint Arab action.

It is worth noting that the Arab League's 1991 budget totalled \$27.239 million. The percentage of the Arab League countries's contributions to the budget are as follows:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 14 percent; Kuwait, 14 percent; Libya, 12 percent; Iraq, 10 percent; Egypt, 8.5 percent; Algeria, 8 percent; the UAE, 6.5 percent; Morocco, 5 percent; Bahrain, 2 percent; Oman, 2 percent; Yemen, 2 percent; Tunisia, 1.5 percent; Sudan, 1.5 percent; Syria, 1.5 percent; Jordan, 1 percent; Djibouti, 1 percent; Somalia, 1 percent; and Mauritania, 1 percent.

Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, and Yemen have expressed reservations regarding the rate of their contribution to the Budget, and some of the Arab states have not paid their dues since 1978 while Bahrain paid only part of its share.

#### **League Ministers Make Plans To Aid West Bank Students**

*91AA0560B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
18 Jul 91 p 4*

[Article: "Arab League Discusses Israeli Oppression of Arab Students"]

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—Today the Arab League Educational Curricula Committee for Arab Students in the Occupied Territories will conclude its discussion of a study on how to confront Israeli practices against Arab students.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that the committee recommendations will call on the Arab Radio Stations' Union to take advantage of Arabsat to implement guided programs and to strengthen contact with the Jerusalem Free University.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has also learned that the committee will support a plan to guard Palestinian children against the catastrophe of illiteracy and will develop makeup programs to compensate Palestinian students for the closure of schools in the occupied territories.

The committee conference has been headed by Ambassador Ibrahim Mustafa, the Egyptian delegation chairman, and attended by representatives of Jordan, Syria, Palestine, UNESCO, and the Arab League's General Secretariat.



**Arab League Begins Meetings To Amend Charter***91P40387A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
31 Jul 91 p 4*

[Text] Cairo—The seven-country committee designated to amend the Arab League's current charter and discuss the establishment of an Arab court of justice met yesterday at Arab League headquarters. Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, the Arab League secretary general, chaired the meeting, which was attended by envoys from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Iraq. After the meeting, Egyptian Arab League envoy Ambassador Mahmud Abu-al-Nasr said that they had discussed studies to implement the Arab summit's decision to amend the charter and to establish an Arab court of justice.

Abu-al-Nasr affirmed that they had agreed to hold another committee meeting on 26 August to complete their discussions and to become acquainted with the views of all Arab countries. This will be in preparation to put the final form of the Arab court of justice project in place and submit it to the next Arab League session which, it has been decided, will be held in September.

**League Studies Merging Specialized Organizations***91AA0574A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
1 Aug 91 p 2*

["Arab League Studies Conditions of Specialized Arab Organizations"]

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that the Arab League Secretariat is conducting a comprehensive study on the conditions of the specialized Arab organizations to assess their role in serving Arab causes, their effectiveness in the Arab and international arenas, and the problems they face.

Arab League Secretariat sources have asserted that the study seeks to make a real assessment of the position of these organizations, 17 altogether, and of the possibility of merging some of the organizations that specialize in similar areas. The study also seeks to create a main council that determines and charts the general policy of these organizations to prevent contradiction between their specializations. The sources added that there is currently general agreement among the Arab countries not to establish any new organization emanating from the Arab League, whether as branches controlled by the League or as independent organizations. Moreover, the current studies on amending the Arab League charter also provide for dealing with the issue of the specialized Arab organizations to enable them to shoulder their Arab and technical responsibilities more capably and effectively.

**Plans Being Made for New Arab Construction Bank***91AA0533B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
15 Jul 91 p 9*

[Article: "New Arab Construction and Development Bank With Capital of \$4 Billion"]

[Text] Cairo-AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Bureau—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned from informed economic sources that economic feasibility studies for creating an Arab construction and development bank similar to the World Bank and the regional Asian, Latin American, and African banks have been completed.

The sources have said that the bank's capital will amount to nearly \$4 billion and that its objective is to draft executive Arab trade programs and to develop Arab stock exchange and securities markets.

The bank is also to play in the Arab region the role of financial middleman between the markets of capital-borrowing countries on the one hand and the countries that supply money on the other hand. Moreover, the bank is to provide soft-term loans with long repayment periods, especially for real estate projects.

Economic experts in Egypt agree unanimously on the importance of creating such a bank by virtue of the fact that circumstances have proven that the world needs to have stability established in the Arab region.

**Inter-Arab Investment Figures Published for 1990***91AA0569C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
29 Jul 91 p 10*

[Article: "Inter-Arab Investments up to \$400 Million in 1990"]

[Text] Dr. Ma'mun Hasan, president of the Arab Investment Guarantee Institution, said that, despite the major challenges the Arab nation faced during the last five months of last year, the institution's statistics show a rise in incoming Arab investments authorized for the year to \$400.8 million, compared to \$258.5 million for 1989.

He indicated that contracts of guarantee signed last year amounted to \$161 million, a 12 percent increase over last year.

He also said that the \$400.8 million was distributed over ten countries, 39 percent of which went to the industrial sector; 16.1 percent to the financial sector; 9.6 percent to the banking, trade, and services sector; and 1.6 percent to the agricultural sector.

He said that 1990 witnessed a growing tendency in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, and Sudan toward the institution of numerous structural changes to lower the budget deficit and free the interest and exchange rates. The institution's capital outlay at the end of last year amounted to \$77.8 million, an increase of \$622,000. Its



reserves amounted to \$95.4 million and Arab shareholdings totalled \$173.3 million.

The total number of projects on which feasibility studies were prepared is estimated at 50, ranging in cost from \$450 to \$500 million.

Guarantee applications in the wake of the Gulf crisis have risen 50 percent at a time when the institution is looking into reparations for projects set up in Gulf countries.

### **Egypt Warns Israel on Territorial Waters Violations**

91AA0533A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
17 Jul 91 p 4

[Article: "Second Incident of Israeli Boat Infiltration of Egyptian Territorial Waters"]

[Text] Cairo—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Bureau—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that Egypt has stressed to Israel the need to avoid a repetition of the incidents of Israeli boat infiltration of protected Egyptian territorial waters and to steer clear of any attempt to damage these protected areas and the coral reefs existing in them.

It is expected that a technical committee will go to the area that witnessed the second Israeli infiltration in the past two weeks to assess the damage done to the coral reefs in this area.

At the same time, the Egyptian Government has focused its efforts on this area to protect it from exposure to new perils and to implement a system for the early apprehension of such offenders.

The protected Egyptian areas were subjected yesterday to a second violation by Israelis conducting recreational cruises of the Red Sea. The Egyptian authorities concerned seized the boat and its passengers whose identity was determined only after they had been arrested. They were deported, along with their boat, to Israel when it was determined that they had entered the area by mistake.

### **Refusal of Egypt To Extradite DUP Members to Sudan**

91P40373A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
24 Jul 91 p 1

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that in recent indirect contacts, Egypt urged the Sudanese Government not to escalate the [tense] situation between the two countries.

Informed sources indicated that Cairo has information and documents that substantiate the involvement of some agencies in Sudan in planning hostile operations against Egypt.

The Egyptian request came on the heels of a request by Sudanese authorities that Egypt extradite some members of the Sudanese Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in Cairo, on the grounds that they are engaging in activities opposed to the [National] Salvation Revolution [Command] Council in Sudan and are planning to overthrow the regime of Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir. However, Cairo sources claim that members of the DUP in Cairo are not involved in insurrectionist activities against the regime in Sudan and that the various communiques they issue are in support of Egyptian policies on Arab issues and in support of the Gulf countries and, therefore, cannot be construed as activities hostile to the Sudanese regime.

### **Egypt's Frozen Membership in ACC Called 'Irrevocable'**

91AA0490B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
1 Jul 91 p 4

[Article: "Egypt to Freeze Membership in ACC"]

[Text] AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned from sources in Cairo that Egypt's decision to freeze its membership in the Arab Cooperation Council [ACC] is irrevocable; that all bilateral contacts that have taken place between it and each of Jordan and Yemen, in the wake of the liberation of Kuwait, included the two countries' desire to improve bilateral relations with Egypt; and that the subject of the ACC was not raised for discussion or debate.

The sources mentioned that the orientation of Egypt's Arab policy in the current stage, in the wake of the gulf crisis, is based on the principle of adherence to the Arab League charter and the agreements emanating from it, in the forefront of which is the Arab Joint Defense Agreement. This is in addition to the Damascus Declaration, signed 6 March 1991, between Egypt, Syria and the six gulf countries which grew out of the Arab League charter.

The sources said that the ACC secretariat, currently based in Amman, is run by Hisham Hasan Tawfiq, former ACC assistant secretary who is an Iraqi national; that Dr. Hilmi Nimr, former ACC secretary general, has finished his two-year term as ACC secretary; and that the Arab League secretariat in Cairo had not received any correspondence from the ACC secretariat since the outbreak of the gulf crisis when Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid was selected as secretary general of the Arab League.

### **Former Egyptian Minister Reports on Trip to Libya**

91AA0554A Cairo MISR AL-FATAH in Arabic  
24 Jun, 1 Jul 91

[Article by Lieutenant General Muhammad Fawzi: "Witness in Libya; Builder and Arms Bearer"]



[24 Jun p 2]

[Excerpts] Former Egyptian Minister of War Lt. Gen. Muhammad Fawzi recently paid a long visit to the Libyan Jamahiriyah, during which he visited most Libyan cities, studying the dimensions of the revolution first hand and talking with a random sampling of people. His purpose was to see for himself the developments that Libyan society has achieved over more than 21 years of revolution, which has succeeded in moving the Libyan community into progressive civilization. [passage omitted]

Examination, inquiry, and grasping the goals of the comprehensive growth of the Libyan people was the basis for the itinerary of this visit, which lasted for 15 days, during which we crisscrossed a modern, international highway network from west to east, and then south. This network, with its length and width of roads, traffic signs, and abundant signposts, is considered the biggest and most modern road system not just in the Arab countries, but in the whole Third World. The vehicles of the people are able to move over these roads in any direction in ease and comfort, which was made necessary by the vast distances in the Jamahiriyah, whose coastal strip alone is more than three [as published] kilometers.

The vast Gulf of Sirt, extending south to the parallel connecting Benghazi and Tripoli for more than 500 kilometers, separates the Jamahiriyah into three geographic areas: the eastern area—Benghazi; the central area—Sirtica; and the western area—Tripoli. The Jamahiriyah launched its great revolution on this parallel, "the line of death," i.e., "the destruction of the aggressor," who attempts to penetrate it southward. [passage omitted]

The planning for the Libyan people's comprehensive development included establishing several modern strategic-level factories serving their economic integration with other countries of the Arab nation. The first of these included the iron and steel plant, a spare parts plant for both military and civilian use, and the electronics and optical plant. In addition, there is the food security plant, providing the Jamahiriyah with abundant food in its three geographic regions.

The spirit of Arab nationalism was embodied in the cadres of workers and technicians we observed, including Libyans, Egyptians, and Sudanese, as well as others from Chad, Tunisia, and Morocco, working together in these huge strategic factories, although the management of these plants is still being retained by certain foreign technical cadres who refused to go along with their governments' decision to boycott Libya. They are satisfied and productive there. They enjoy specific privileges that make them content with their jobs, especially since they train new Libyan cadres in all fields.

We sensed a distribution of workers according to their abilities. We found that female workers were concentrated in jobs in the electronic and optical materials

factory, once they were qualified in specialized training centers. We noted that the logic of the revolution has not forgotten the benefit from, and the participation of half the people—the women—in the comprehensive development plan for the Jamahiriyah. [passage omitted]

Then came the security plan, and preparing the armed forces' command and control. Then came the armament, "the most modern in existence," followed by the creation and formation of units based on various weapons and military facilities, and excellent, continual training built on practical bases. Then came military industrialization. The general command of the revolution has achieved a symphony balanced between the interests of strategic command and control, and of qualifying commanders and troops on modern weaponry and the practical use of these weapons, together with the study of military history, as well as armed clashes throughout the world, most especially the study and understanding of the Gulf War. This is the hand that bears the weapon.

The first priority, from the point of view of national security, was for the revolution to learn about its enemy, his movements, goals, and ambitions, and thereby gain self-awareness, in order to prepare from the beginning to resist this enemy, and to always be prepared to confront him. The outcome of the confrontation and resistance depends on the will of the revolution, and its independence of resolve is the basis that forces it to take measures for the confrontation, for the sake of the freedom of its nation and citizens. [passage omitted]

I took advantage of the opportunity of this visit to Libya to ask people of various professions and ages, in every facility and establishment, in the street, the cities, and on farms, the following questions: What has the al-Fatih Revolution done for you and your family? What have the popular committees done for you and your family? Do you want cooperation or union with the Egyptian people?

The answers pleased me and gave me hope for an Arab nation, despite the political pessimists who need the psychology of the nationalist forces in the Arab nation in 1991.

[1 Jul p 2]

[Excerpts] The first reaction that I pursued, with regard to the Popular conferences and Committees' exercise of their functions in daily life, was whether the voting public had gained trust in the members of these committees, as I sensed. I talked with a large number of them. Trust in the historic leadership generated confidence in the new, unique system of government in the Libyan Jamahiriyah. The masses have stuck with the revolution and its leadership, with an adherence based only on the best interests of the masses themselves. It has become impossible to turn this adherence into disassociation at any time, so long as the interests of the masses—and their future—are the basic connection for this.



I pursued another matter that concerns every progressive, nationalist Arab; that is the search for the bureaucracy left behind by colonialism in the governing apparatus in every Arab country. This bureaucracy still causes the restrictions and obstacles against natural progress. In Libya, I found nothing preventing the progress of financial and administrative affairs, either behind the scenes of Popular Committees, or among merchants in the Libyan streets, especially as concerns the people. I concluded that the revolution has directed its attention toward the traditions and customs resulting from this disease, deeply rooted in every Arab country. The backwardness and ignorance of all worldly matters that concern the masses were left behind for us.

The hatred of the Libyan people for colonialism and its legacy to them, which is harmful to their general lives and their future, has created in them the *khawajah* [title of address for Christians and Westerners] complex, which is now developing into a *khahir* [expert] complex. Despite their technical competence, the revolution was hesitant about selecting and employing a small number of foreign experts in major industrial projects while, at the same time, its doors were trustingly opening to every Arab expert. The Jamahiriya is a part of the Arab nation, and the proposed development plan that it has adopted is aimed at achieving economic integration with the Arab countries, especially the countries of the golden triangle—Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. I noted that the number of experts was considerably less than the strategic project required, especially when I recognized that a technical awareness of highly skilled proficiency has not yet reached a great number of Libyan cadres.

The extent of the abundant political awareness of the Libyan people is a part of the harvest of people's responses to my question about relations between the individual and the governing apparatus, that is, the bond and trust between the two. I felt that the reactions gave a clear confirmation of the connection of people with the revolutionary leadership, and the leadership of the governing apparatus, or rather, their love for them, so long as they care for the masses' interests. This is clearly manifested in the Libyan streets, when Colonel Mu'ammār Qadhafi tours among his people daily, crossing the Jamahiriya from east to west, without the guards that we are accustomed to seeing with his counterpart Arab leaders.

We also tried to provoke some people by repeating what is being said about the governing system in the Jamahiriya, or about its leader, outside of the country. I found no echo of this in the hearts of the Libyans. On the contrary, their reaction to, and comments about, such statements was that foreign imperialism always broaches, publishes, and renews such statements out of envy and malice toward the position and astuteness of the Libyan people and their leader. [passage omitted]

The second reaction that I felt as I toured all Libyan cities was the absence of policemen from Libyan streets, with their traditional military uniforms. In all Arab

countries this uniform represents the awe and power of authoritarian government. However, the idea of the revolution stresses that the people are capable of defending themselves alone. The show of discipline, with regard to the movement of traffic on Libyan streets, has been limited to traffic men in military uniforms who serve and facilitate the automotive traffic with which Tripoli's streets are filled.

Therefore, I believe that the new governing system, with its theory, ideals, and goals, has concentrated on achieving the demands of citizens and their present and future families, in the Glorious Socialist People's Libyan Arab al-Jamahiriya.

### **Egyptian Delegation To Visit Libya, Finish Talks**

91AA0569B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
28 Jul 91 p 4

[Article: "Egyptian Parties Endorse Egyptian-Libyan Rapprochement

[Text] Egyptian party leaders and independent members of parliament affirmed their endorsement of Egyptian-Libyan rapprochement measures aimed at making amends for rift between the two countries for the last 12 years and at laying down sound foundations for Egyptian-Libyan relations to protect them from future vacillation or tension that might impact on joint development projects now under implementation.

During the Egyptian-Libyan parliamentary discussion session held in Cairo last Thursday and chaired by Egyptian Speaker Dr. Ahmad Fathi Surur and by 'Abd-al-Razzaq Abu-Bakr al-Susa, the secretary general of the Libyan General People's Conference, the Egyptian party representative called for bolstering political, social, and economic ties between the Egyptian and Libyan peoples and holding regular meetings between the Egyptian parliament and the Libyan People's Conference, starting off from the ten agreements unanimously ratified by the Egyptian parliament and the Libyan People's Conference.

In a statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Muhammad Mahmud Hijazi, the secretary of cooperation with Egypt, confirmed the existence of joint programs at the party level with the ruling National Democratic Party in Egypt and the Libyan People's Conference, and that programs with Egyptian unions and Libya are under preparation now. These programs aim to expanding the scope of cooperation with Egypt in all the various fields. This is in accordance with instructions issued by Libyan Colonel Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi to achieve unity between the two countries.

The secretary of cooperation with Egypt said that he is now following an executive program with the Ministers of Industry, Electricity, Communications, Public Works, and Labor in both countries that includes conducting studies on the merger of similar industrial projects in both Egypt and Libya. A number of Egyptian advisors



are in Libya now studying the merger plan and industrial integration between the two countries.

A high-level Egyptian parliamentary delegation will visit Libya next month to conclude the talks with the Libyan People's Conference and reach an agreement on forming a joint coordination committee fashioned after the joint parliamentary branches.

### **Trip Report Submitted by Egyptian Delegation to Africa**

91AA0574B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
1 Aug 91 p 4

["Egypt Supports Efforts of Custodian of Two Holy Sites to Contain Conflict in Somalia"]

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that Egyptian President Husni Mubarak has recently received a report on the conditions in the Horn of Africa from the Egyptian delegation which had visited a number of African countries under the chairmanship of 'Umar Jad, the Egyptian assistant foreign minister. During the visit, the delegation met with a number of these countries' leaders and officials and followed up on the Ethiopian reconciliation conference meetings in Djibouti.

Cairo sources have confirmed that Egypt has conveyed to the warring parties in Somalia its support and backing for the efforts Saudi Arabia is currently making under the auspices of King Fahd, the custodian of the two holy sites, to bring about complete reconciliation, to end the armed conflict, to preserve Somalia's territorial integrity, and to reject any endeavor to take the conflict out of its Arab and African context. The Egyptian report stresses the need to develop a new Egyptian strategy on Egypt's relations with countries in the Horn of Africa in light of the changes and developments a number of these countries have witnessed recently. The report also urges that emphasis be put on the link between Egypt's vital interests and stable political and security conditions in the Horn of Africa, and between these interests and keeping the region away from the spheres of international conflicts.

The report also calls for giving importance to Afro-Arab cooperation with the countries of the Horn of Africa because of their proximity to the Arab region and the link between pan-Arab security with security in this region, which is vital and strategic to the Arab countries. The report also urges the need for Egyptian-Sudanese coordination in this direction.

### **Egypt Seeks African Support for Ghali's UN Nomination**

91AA0574C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
1 Aug 91 p 4

["Egyptian Activity to Support Ghali's Nomination for Post of UN Secretary General"]

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that a new round of contacts and consultations between six African countries—led by Egypt—that have thrown their hats into the ring by nominating their representatives to the position of UN secretary general, will begin in the near future. These contacts aim to coordinate these nominations in wake of the resolution made by the African summit held in Abuja, Nigeria, to form a six-member African committee for this purpose. Informed sources have said that Egypt's nomination of deputy prime minister for foreign affairs Dr. Butrus Ghali for this UN position was received with great welcome by a number of African countries, especially the countries with a Afro-Arab dual identity, in wake of the contacts made by Egypt on the peripheries of the African summit.

The sources noted that Dr. Ghali's personality has gained him great trust in the African continent, with whose problems he has lived for more than 10 years. This gives Dr. Ghali a greater chance than his competitor's to win Africa's support.

It is reiterated that there could be surprises before the countdown for officially submitting the nominations, and that these surprises will be embodied in one or more countries withdrawing their nominees to support another African country's nominee.

In a related development, informed sources have confirmed that Egypt has gotten extensive European support for Dr. Ghali in wake of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's recent European tour, during which he visited Britain and France.

These sources have also said that other rounds of contacts will be held in the next two months with Europe and the nonaligned group. Egypt will also consult with the Islamic countries that will participate in the Islamic countries' foreign ministers conference, which will convene in Istanbul tomorrow [2 August].

### **Iraqi Experience Described by Egyptian Doctors**

91AA0560A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic  
17 Jul 91 p 14

[Article: "Testimony of Egyptians Returning From Iraq; Story of Escape From Hell; Kurdish Rebellion Enabled Us To Survive"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Here is an eyewitness testimony offered to AKHIR SA'AH by two Egyptian doctors who were destined to live the crisis from the time it started last August to the time it ended when they were able to leave Iraq via Iran at the end of March, the first days of the developments of the Kurdish rebellion in the north. In Iran is where they were surprised. Contrary to what they had expected, they were received very warmly and with full welcome by every Iranian they met. Previously, they had believed that the Iranians were, to put it in the words of one of the two doctors, cannibals!



### **Beginning of Tragedy**

Before we hear the "document-like testimony," we have to underline a few observations to understand dimensions of the situation.

The testimony of the two doctors may be very special by virtue of the nature of their profession. They were treated well because they were needed, and they did not face fully what has been faced by tens of thousands of Egyptians who have experienced the crisis and who were engaged in other professions.

Circumstances dictated that they work in the north, where the majority is Kurdish. The Kurds have taken a special, good position toward the Egyptians, contrary to what has been faced by tens of thousands of Egyptians in other Iraqi cities, such as Baghdad and Mosul, and even al-Basrah in the south.

Resorting to Iran as an escape route was not so much an option as it was a necessity, considering that Iraq had sealed its borders with Turkey and that the alliance forces had struck the route across the Iraqi-Jordanian borders. The only option left was the Iranian border, which was opened only during the days of the Kurdish rebellion.

Now, let us read the document-like testimony:

Dr. 'Adil Fahmi's story begins in 1986. After failing to obtain work in any Gulf state, he heard that Iraq was open to all Arabs and so decided to try his luck there. He packed his things up and before three days had passed, Dr. Fahmi had a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Health as a nose, ear, and throat doctor. Before his contract was renewed, he was offered a job as an anesthesiologist, and he agreed. He was given two months of training, even though training under such circumstances requires a full year. Generally, "God let things pass safely" and not a single death occurred while he practiced his new job as an anesthesiologist. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, he found himself in charge of al-Jumhuriyah Hospital in Irbil, because all the Iraqi physicians had been drafted.

The circumstances of Dr. Usamah Fu'ad Niqula's story of struggle are different from those of his colleague. In February 1989, the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo advertised that Iraq needed an anesthesiologist. Dr. Niqula submitted his papers and they were accepted immediately, because there was no interest among Egyptian doctors to go there. Dr. Niqula had to work in Mosul for five months and then had to go to Irbil, where he worked as an anesthesiologist, obstetrician, and pediatrician at the same hospital where Dr. 'Adil Fahmi worked. [passage omitted]

### **Mistreatment of Egyptians**

Noting the conditions in Irbil, a Kurdish town in northern Iraq, Dr. Niqula said: "The Kurds had hoped for war in the belief that it would bring the end of Saddam Husayn's dictatorial rule, especially since they

had suffered greatly at the hands of the Ba'th regime in the northern provinces. Dr. Niqula recalled that when Kurds saw a military aircraft, they would wonder if it was an Iraqi aircraft or "one of our aircraft," meaning one of the allied forces' aircraft. Life came to a halt at 1900 in the 1986-88 period when the northern towns were exposed to the attacks of Talabani's and Barzani's combat elements. After the Halabjah developments and the use of chemicals against the Kurds, the government, the Ba'th elements, and the domestic security forces gained full control there.

In the streets and in Iraq's other towns, the treatment of Egyptians was completely different. The two doctors were not subjected to insult by virtue of the nature of their work and of their presence in the Kurdish northern province. In Mosul, for example, the hospital admission office gets numerous cases of Egyptians wounded as a result of fights with Iraqis.

An Iraqi woman went to an Egyptian shop owner and said to him: "Is this fair? You are buying and selling here and my son is there in Kuwait. If I hear that anything has happened to him, I will shoot you."

After the blockade, some Iraqi bakeries refused to sell bread to Egyptians just because they were Egyptians.

Another Egyptian went to a tire shop and the owner refused to sell him anything just because he was an Egyptian.

One Egyptian lost all his money. He was a confectionery owner and he imported everything he needed from Turkey. His factory was completely shut down after the blockade against Iraq.

Dr. Niqula noted the state of wrath that prevailed in all Iraqi provinces in wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. He said: "In a discussion I had with some intellectuals, they said to me that they deserved all that was happening to them as long as 'this is our position toward this dictatorial regime and as long as negativism is what controls us.'" He added: "On the day Saddam Husayn announced his acceptance of the 1975 treaty with Iran, I heard an Iraqi woman wailing 'Then why did I lose my two sons? What was that war for?'"

Dr. 'Adil Fahmi said: "When the blockade continued from the beginning of August until the [military] operations started, discontent became evident among all Kurds. They escalated their struggle and their contacts with the Kurdish opposition movement. They had hoped that the United States would rid them of Saddam Husayn."

### **Rebellion That Did Not Last**

The rebellion and revolution then started in the northern towns. Dr. Fahmi said: "I lived with my family next to the police station in Irbil. I saw an armed man enter the station and then numerous cars arrived. Rifles and ammunition were seized and indiscriminate shooting



started. All government installations were damaged. The office of the director of public health was seized and destroyed. The land register office was burned down. All jails were opened and all of Saddam Husayn's pictures were destroyed. The Kurds seized Irbil in three hours. They also got control of al-Sulaymaniyah. There was government resistance in Kirkuk. All elements of the Iraqi administration escaped and the Kurds killed any partisans they got hold of. A state of total anarchy prevailed, and there was looting because of the numerous party organizations. Our work load at the hospital increased, especially with the increased number of casualties. We worked day and night to handle that number. At times, we worked for 48 hours without a break. We were surprised that our efforts were lauded by Kurdistan Radio before it was recaptured by the Republican Guard troops, who also destroyed everything. The smallest damage sustained by a house was one hit by an RPG. It is my belief that the situation would have been different if the Kurds had heavy weapons. Liberation of the Kurdish area would have continued."

The revolution did not last long. As Dr. Usamah Niquila said, "The Guard troops issued their orders for the trial and execution of whoever had a role in the rebellion, even if such a person was a humanitarian. We felt that there was real danger and thought for the first time about the need to get out of Iraq, especially since the Kurds had opened the borders with Iran and Turkey during the rebellion. But the latter sealed its borders because of the river of thousands of Kurds who had fled to save their lives. So the only option available to us was Iran. We thought it was risky, but that the risk was nowhere near the risk of staying in Irbil. We were encouraged to do this by what we had heard about some doctors who had surrendered to the Kurdish forces. They were treated well and they actually began working in the same hospital in which we worked.

"We started the return trip to Egypt via Iran. We hired a bus and agreed, as a group of Egyptians, to flee and get out. The others had nothing, even though one of them was the owner or co-owner of a hotel in Irbil. We paid the cost of the trip to escape hell. The bus driver was an Iraqi of Iranian extraction and he spoke Persian well. He facilitated many things for us, especially since we had obtained a certificate from the Kurdistan Islamic Party attesting to our role during the rebellion. This certificate helped us greatly. After being given an unexpectedly good reception at the immigration and passports department, we were told: 'This is to make you compare Saddam's Islam and Iran's Islam.' We toured the town of Urumiyeh, an Iranian border town, and went to Khoy, where there was a camp to provide care for refugees. We stayed at this camp for several days. The stay was good and food was available. There was an international [telephone] line, through which we were able to contact our kinsmen in Cairo for the first time since 15 January. Three days after our arrival at the camp, the situation changed completely. The Republican Guard had established firm control over the northern towns and the

Kurds were fleeing by the thousands from Saddam's hell. We started with only 35 people in the camp, but then this number leaped to 20,000-25,000 Kurds. The Iranians tried as hard as they could to provide the essentials, including tents, food, and blankets. But what could Iran do for all those thousands? Nothing. We had to work as doctors, especially since cases of dysentery, contagious liver inflammation [hepatitis], malnutrition, and other ailments were rising in number. We had to stay in this camp for almost 17 days, during which we realized the dimensions of the tragedy and felt the meaning of death by escape.

"The torture trip did not end there. They transported us to another camp for Iraqi refugees in the holy city of Qom. The trip was more than eight hours long. Things went well until tens of thousands of Shi'ite Iraqis descended on the camp. We heard from them the horrors to which the southern towns were subjected. Al-Basrah, for example, was turned into a mere name after it had been leveled to the ground by the allied forces' air raids and the Republican Guard attacks in wake of the Shi'ite rebellion. We had to experience the tragedy again. Once again, we had to perform our role as doctors to treat thousands of Shi'ites, with the help of foreign and Iranian doctors.

"The return trip to Cairo began when the number of Egyptians at Qom Camp rose to 100. At that point, a representative of UNRWA [UN Relief and Works Agency] came, took our passport numbers, and issued travel documents to those who had lost their passports. Contacts were then begun with Cairo to lease a plane from a private firm. The plane arrived 15 days later. We, as a group of Egyptians, gave a party to honor the Iranian camp chief in recognition of the good treatment we received and in appreciation of what the Iranians had done for us.

"We have returned from Iraq, via Iran, after losing everything and all our money, especially since Saddam Husayn had ordered that the salaries of doctors be remitted in full at the end of their contracts. Upon our return, there were no banks and no government. We had to choose between life and money. We abandoned the second and decided to live on Egypt's soil. The hardship and torture voyage ended and we gained nothing but bitterness, pain, and a narrow escape. With our own eyes, we saw the fall of the era of propaganda and illusions."

#### **Israeli Intelligence Collection on Iraq Questioned**

91AE0505A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew  
19 Jul 91 (Weekend Supplement) pp 7, 27

[Article by Ron Ben Yishai]

[text] "In Iraq, we had no Eli Cohen," Minister of Defense Moshe Arens said this week in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the Knesset. Members of the committee who complained about the small



amount of information that the Israeli intelligence community supplied about the Iraqis' atomic weapons program, heard from him another crushing sentence, which in reality constituted an admission of failure. "It is good to want to know, but making it really happen is something else."

Arens implied that the forced budget cuts were what chained the hands of the Israeli intelligence, which does the maximum possible in the conditions it works under. In the same tone of fatalism-pessimism, Arens tried to prescribe a sedative for the Israeli public and its worried representatives in the Knesset: to get used to the situation and lower their expectations regarding the intelligence community functions.

But the truth is, it is not lack of funds that is responsible for the intelligence shortcomings where Iraq is concerned. To the same extent, it is not necessary to accept as a decree from heaven the fact that we do not have an Eli Cohen at the top level of the regime in Baghdad. If, for example, Israel had invested the resources that it allocated to the "Lavi" project five years ago, to a project of developing the "Ofek" and "Amos" satellites, this year we would not have been facing scuds like a blind cow, with a half-blind American shepherd leading it by the nose.

Iraq was flooded with foreign experts over the last seven years. Scientists, technicians, and businessmen from the West were received there like kings, met with Saddam Husayn, and roamed freely among his armament plants. If the Israeli intelligence community had recognized in time how serious and immediate the Iraqi threat was, maybe today we would have somebody—maybe more than one—who would do in Baghdad what Eli Cohen did in Damascus.

There is an ironic aspect here: precisely in everything that relates to Saddam's nuclear armament program—the area that public criticism of the intelligence community is focusing on today—the Israeli intelligence community has had some marked successes. It was the Mossad (Central Institute for Intelligence and Special Missions) and the Intelligence Branch which already, three years ago, were the ones who knew enough to warn of Iraq's nonconventional armament program. Foreign publications report that Mossad agents played a decisive part in delaying and torpedoing these plans—whether it was through information they passed on, as the foreign publications claim, to the United States and British intelligence services, or through independent activities that led to halting the development of the Iraqi "Super Cannon," and kept Iraq from obtaining vital components for the development of an atomic bomb.

If we believe the foreign publications, we can be quite certain in the evaluation, that the frustrating action of Israeli intelligence was what kept Iraq from getting the components and the necessary know-how to build an operational atomic bomb from the enriched uranium and the plutonium that Iraq had managed to pile up. In

the face of this achievement, the fact that we did not also know about the third channel Iraq used to manufacture fissionable material seems much less important.

But the list of intelligence successes connected with Iraq does not end here. 'Aman (Military Intelligence) correctly prophesied the possibility that Saddam Husayn would carry out his threats and invade Kuwait. It estimated correctly from the beginning how all the powers involved in the crisis that had developed since the invasion and up to the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, would act. Just before the fighting began, Intelligence correctly estimated that Saddam would try to involve Israel in the fighting by shooting missiles, but would refrain from a land attack. In the course of the war, 'Aman and the Mossad gave policymakers in Israel an up-to-date and accurate picture of the situation on the battlefield, and forecasted with great accuracy the moves of both the Iraqis and the allies.

When the Americans finally decided to share with us the full information that their spy satellites and planes supplied to them, on what was happening in western Iraq, the 'Aman experts did better than their American counterparts at decoding this information, and extracting its operational implications. The Israeli-American cooperation in this realm, during the war, enabled the allies to more efficiently take air action to suppress the firing of scuds at Israel.

But these successes, important as they may be, are not enough to make up for basic and fundamental deficiencies that the Gulf war revealed in the activities of the Israeli intelligence community, especially in the activities of the Mossad and 'Aman. The Mother of all Failures was the evaluation of the strategic situation by the experts of 'Aman, which was presented to Israeli policymakers at the end of the Iran-Iraq war, in the summer of 1987. The evaluation of this situation was that Iraq would concentrate, in the next four or five years, on restoring its economy and its army, which were wrecked in the eight years of exhausting fighting with Iran. The same evaluation determined that during this period of restoration, Saddam Husayn would refrain from new military initiatives and adventures, especially against Israel, whose strength he knew and feared.

There were also those among the intelligence experts, and among the policymakers in Israel in that period, who even saw in Saddam signs of readiness for reconciliation and [willingness to] compromise with us. No member of the intelligence community went as far in his hopefulness over these signs, but they constituted an additional license for evaluation that the threat to Israel coming from Iraq was not immediate. In the last years of the 1980's, Assad was seen as a greater threat than Saddam. The conclusion was that we needed to continue the preparations for dealing with the Iraqi missiles and divisions, but on limited alert. Nobody thought seriously about readiness at the rear, or about means of warning of and interception of missiles—except for, perhaps, the



General Director of the Ministry of Defense, David Ivri, who relied mainly on his common sense, and not on intelligence evaluations.

That famous evaluation of the situation also determined that a state of hostility between Iraq and Iran would continue and would confine a large proportion of the Iraqi forces to the border between the two countries. Conclusion: Even if an eastern coalition was created against Israel, Saddam would not be able to send more than five to eight divisions to the Israeli front, and even then, not his best.

In 'Aman, they ignored the fact, already known before this, that Saddam was capable of changing overnight from a foe to an ally, and vice versa, if it served his strategic goals. He made several turnabouts like this during his many years of war with the Kurds, and also during the extended conflict with Iran.

It was more reasonable to estimate that, in the event that an eastern coalition crystallized against Israel, Saddam would first secure the rear by an agreement with the Iranians—as he did before the conflict in Kuwait—and then would be free to send as many forces against us as he might desire. But 'Aman stuck to the version “an Iraqi expeditionary force at a maximum of five to eight divisions to the front with Israel,” and only the invasion of Kuwait prevented us from having to put this estimation of the situation to the test.

If this mistaken appraisal, which underestimated the weight and immediacy of the Iraqi threat, is the major intelligence failure in the Gulf war, then the reliance on the Americans and on their technological intelligence was the major source of this failure. Together with the Americans, we also were surprised at the appearance of “al-Husayn” missiles during the time of the Iran-Iraq war. From the data the Americans supplied us, we did not know for certain until the end of the Gulf war if the Iraqis had chemical warheads for the “al-Husayn” missiles, and what kind. If we had known what we know today, that the Iraqis developed hastily, during the war, primitive chemical warheads that scatter their poisonous contents only when they hit the ground, most probably, the security staff would have gathered the population into bunkers and not in sealed rooms, exposed to the greater danger of conventional warheads.

The reliance on the Americans resulted in the information on the number of fixed and mobile launchers for the “al-Husayn” missiles in western Iraq not being up-to-date and precise. The American promises that there would not be a second missile attack on Israel were baseless, and all the information about the missile taking a long time to launch was misleading.

American intelligence is fundamentally strategic intelligence. There is a difference between the intelligence needs of a world power—for whom the real danger is from large, long-range strategic weapons, fairly easy to find and keep track of—and the needs of a small country, threatened by great masses of relatively short-range

conventional weapons. The Americans could allow themselves “to lose” two divisions of the Republican Guard, who slipped under the nose of intelligence in the American field, at the end of the ground assault of “Desert Storm.” This did not endanger Schwarzkopf and his soldiers, and also did not prevent the execution of the mission. But for us an intelligence mistake like that is likely to bring disaster.

My colleague Rami Tal, “Yediot Aharonot” correspondent in Washington, has already described in detail the American intelligence failure in the Gulf war and its reasons. But even if the American tactical intelligence had functioned as it should have in the Gulf, it is reasonable to assume that Israel would not have been able to do without her own independent information gathering about Iraq. In spite of the cooperation between the two states, the Americans keep from us, as policy, certain kinds of intelligence material.

The Americans have said openly that they do not want to supply material to Israel that will enable her to act forcefully against Iraq. They also followed this policy in the days when the Pentagon was providing Iraq with classified material of the first order, so that she could prevail over Iran. Minister Arens pounded vainly on the doors of the Pentagon and the White House, asking for more intelligence cooperation in the days before “Desert Storm.”

According to foreign publications, Israel was forced to buy the services of the commercial satellite, “Spot,” in France, in order to receive material not provided us by the Americans. It is hardly necessary to point out that this material, naturally, was of the lowest quality. At that same time, because of the American presence in the region, and because of the state of supreme readiness in Iraq, the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) could not make up the gap by sending its own reconnaissance sorties over Iraq. Only when the water had reached their chins, when the Americans saw that they were not capable of eliminating the scuds as they had promised, did they open the dam, and even then not completely.

The standard answer in the intelligence network to someone who speaks out against intelligence reliance on the Americans, is a shrug of the shoulders. “What could we do. We did not have our own satellites, and also did not have the resources needed to set up commutative fact-gathering networks, that would allow us to receive reliable information in real time about an objective as far away as Iraq,” a very senior official in the intelligence network insists. This answer is only partially accurate, even if it includes a grain of truth. It ignores the fact that Israel had, and still has, the opportunity to overcome the gaps in intelligence attained through technological means, which it did not have, through the more extensive, sophisticated use of field intelligence and spies.

The truth is that the danger to the lives of the chosen few who do this work is great. This fact sometimes makes the leaders recoil from sending actual people to gather



intelligence. But necessity is a cruel master, and sometimes there is a need to overcome inhibitions. A lesson and example in this field was given to us by the paratroopers the Jewish community sent to help the British in the Second World War.

In spite of the above, it would be a mistake to place the blame for the defective intelligence activities on the shoulders of the Mossad and 'Aman. The responsibility for the failure lies, perhaps even equally, on the leaders of the political echelon: the Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, and the Defense Ministers, Rabin and Arens, who served during the period between the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war. Apparently, they did not know how to ask the right questions at the right time, and also did not insist on receiving sufficient answers for questions to which they had been given partial answers. The political echelon was also trapped for too long in the web of "the conception of restoration," which reduced the Iraqi threat. Therefore, those responsible for intelligence gathering were not allocated the resources needed to obtain full information, on time, on Iraq and her intentions.

And if we are preoccupied with parcelling out responsibility, it would be unfair not to point out the fact that the Israeli intelligence deficiency stems, to a great extent, from the sophisticated use Saddam Husayn made of means of camouflage and deceit—both in the field and in the world arena. In this aspect, the Israel intelligence is in good company, together with all the other intelligence services, both Arab and Western, which is some consolation.

#### **SDAR President Abdelaziz Discusses Referendum**

91AA0539A Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE in French  
20 Jun 91 pp 18-19

[Interview of Mohamed Abdelaziz, president of the SDAR, Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, and secretary-general of the Polisario Front, by Malika Abdelaziz; place and date not given]

[Text] This is the last summer that they will spend here, unprotected, in the Tindouf hamma, swept by the burning winds. In a few weeks, the Saharan refugees, who have been acknowledged as qualified to vote, will return to the country to deposit their ballots for the "battle of destiny." Things are moving in this direction. The office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) has held an initial meeting on the issue.

It was here among happy Saharans that I would learn of Algeria's first contribution of a million dollars and an airplane.

Mohamed Abdelaziz spoke to us before the start of the 8th Polisario Congress that clearly displayed its objective in a slogan: "All Saharan forces are needed to win the battle of destiny." His faith in independence is immense. This should come as no surprise, after 16 years of fighting against annexation and acceptance of a high-risk

referendum: keeping on the territory 65,000 men including Moroccan soldiers, civilian settlers, and administrative personnel not directly concerned by the referendum.

The Saharans will experience a first in the history of decolonization. UN organization and control from start to finish of a referendum for self-determination. This partly explains their confidence in the future, their conviction that the international community would not be supporting a sham. Moreover, they point out that 48 countries have already said that they were willing to be part of the United Nations Mission on the Western Sahara Referendum (Minurso), including five permanent members of the Security Council, with 30 representatives each. But their optimism comes primarily from Mauritania and the Canary Islands, where the majority of the Saharan diaspora is residing. And of course from the "occupied territories," as some of the people have received photographs from there of mothers and brothers whom they have not seen since 1975.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] How do you interpret the offer of amnesty from the Moroccan sovereign?

[Mohamed Abdelaziz] In two ways. First, in a humanitarian way, although it appears that the release of these prisoners has certain political conditions attached to it, such as nonmembership in the Polisario and the SDAR, whose objectives they defend. This was the main reason for their imprisonment. Yet if they are to be released from their gloomy cells, we cannot help but rejoice over this from a human standpoint.

Second, we are pleased with this gesture because it is a concrete action in fulfillment of the UN peace plan. This plan and Resolution 690 of the Security Council advocate the exchange of prisoners of war between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front. Morocco is supposed to release all prisoners, whether they are held in the Western Sahara or in southern Morocco. Therefore, as we see it, it is not an offer or a gift but a measure to implement the peace plan. However, I do not regard the method as a sound one. Everything is supposed to be done within the framework of the United Nations and the competent international organizations, in this case the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Another factor is this: we have asked the Moroccan government to account for 300 prisoners of war and over 800 political detainees. What proof do we have that these 1,100 Saharan people are really free? What is their state of health? The procedure is complicated. We have asked the competent international organizations to assist us on this, because we have taken a strong stand in favor of strict observance of the UN resolution, and because we are worried about the fate of our prisoners in the hands of the Moroccan Government.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] How do you plan to ensure a free, regular referendum when the Moroccans still seem to be planning on just a confirmative referendum?



[Abdelaziz] One thing is clear, and that is that the peace plan in general, like Resolution 690, is not a decision of the Polisario or the Moroccan Government, but of the international community and the Security Council. They have been accepted by both the Polisario Front and the government of the Kingdom of Morocco. As a result, it is the sole responsibility of the United Nations to interpret and explain them. The most important thing is that the Security Council decided that it should be a free referendum for the self-determination of the Saharan people. To this end, material, human, financial, organizational, and moral means were spelled out so that the United Nations, in cooperation with the OAU, could organize and supervise a referendum for self-determination, with all the guarantees of freedom of choice for the Saharan people.

On this basis, it is impossible to maintain that it is just a matter of a confirmative referendum. Moreover, we have on record the acceptance by the Moroccan Government of the plan clearly leading to a referendum for self-determination.

[ALGERIE ACTUALITE] Despite the difficulties, despite the reappearance of Moroccan proposals for internal autonomy, do you then rule out recourse to any procedure other than the one determined by the United Nations?

[Abdelaziz] At this point, any statement regarding a solution using other means than the peace plan and Resolution 690, any considerations outside the context of the principle or the role of Minurso, have been overtaken by events. The United Nations has defined and assembled the provisions and mechanisms leading to self-determination. The two parties to the conflict have accepted this settlement plan in its entirety.

Any additional thoughts and efforts should be developed within this context, in support of the peace plan and in compliance with the UN's requirements to attain the objective of self-determination.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] It is said, and not just in Morocco, that a compromise needs to be found so that the results of the referendum do not renew animosities and so that the Maghreb can be given a chance for unity. What do you think about this?

[Abdelaziz] First of all, I would note that permitting the Saharan people to vote under conditions guaranteeing their free choice would in no way hinder chances for building Maghreb unity. On the contrary, this is something that would promote the cause. Secondly, I do not believe that there is any room or chance for compromises, for the simple reason that the referendum plan contains only two options: integration into the Kingdom of Morocco or Saharan independence. There is no other alternative, no possible third choice. As far as we are concerned, we will repeat our commitment to go along with the results of the vote. We will bend to the will of the majority of Saharans expressing their choice under the terms and conditions established by the United

Nations. Having said this, we are open to dialogue, and we are ready to seek fruitful prospective relations between the SDAR and the Moroccan Government. I would point out that this openness and readiness on our part are not something new but have always been there. However, in the current situation, they must be expressed within the framework of the United Nations, and directed towards strengthening the efforts of the international community. What is important is to promote practical moves to implement the peace plan and to remove any obstacles that may come up along the way.

[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] When one arrives at the threshold or at the end of a process leading to national liberation, one frequently sees new problems emerge: power struggles, political differences, regionalism, tribalism, etc. Do you believe that the Polisario will be able to preserve the unity that it has had since 1973?

[Abdelaziz] In my opinion, and from the very extensive and detailed information gathered with regard to the state of mind of the Saharan people and their patriotic forces, it is certain that today the consensus and determination of the Saharan people for national independence are more powerful and shared by more people than ever before. Although there was consensus in favor of the Polisario Front from the beginning, it was about 70 percent. Beginning in 1975 specifically, it went up to 80 percent, for a very simple reason: response to the appeal for national independence made by the Polisario in its political platform. This consensus has been renewed and expanded through the strength and determination shown in making it through the difficult experiences and problems we have had to face for 16 years. In 16 years, the call for armed struggle has affected everybody. At the end of 16 years, Saharans everywhere, whether in the occupied territory or in southern Morocco, are in favor of national independence and freedom. In short, political consciousness has been raised, and Saharan nationalism has become imbedded and deep-seated during these 16 years of struggle. A great experience was acquired in the context of the Polisario Front. The cultural and scientific knowledge of Saharans has grown throughout these years. Saharan nationalism and a national consciousness are now a great deal more solid and profound than at any other time. There are no differences of any kind whatsoever that are worth mentioning: political, regionalistic, tribal, or other. All the people have joined the cause of national independence to win the referendum. They have joined forces to build a Saharan state.

We are about to hold our 8th congress. We have two primary items on our agenda for consideration. First, development of a strategy for the referendum, because this is the last battle and it deserves to be examined as such by the Congress. And secondly, we are going to consider the future government that the Saharan people as a whole want. Plans will be drawn up on these two topics, on the basis of the broad national consensus obtained.



[ALGERIE-ACTUALITE] What will the political, economic, and social options of the Saharan state be?

[Abdelaziz] We have conducted our armed struggle under the Polisario Front, although since the beginning of colonialism, throughout history, the Saharan people attempted to fight against it on every occasion. With the creation of the Polisario in 1973, we initiated our fight, after many African and Third World nations in general had experienced these national liberation struggles. In our case, we tried to benefit and learn from these other experiences as much as possible. In actual fact, our national liberation struggle has its own characteristics. And while learning from others' earlier experiences, ours had its own peculiarities. We have waged our battle in extremely difficult conditions, from every standpoint. We have been no more heroic than others, and we have not won more than others have. All of that is possible, and our struggle has its own characteristics and peculiarities. But with our independence, in building our state in the future, after the referendum, we will draw from the experience of our brothers who have preceded us in this battle for and organization of a nation in our region, in Africa, and in the Third World. We have perhaps suffered more than others, and we are perhaps the last to accede to independence, but nobody can prevent us from drawing on the experience of our brothers, of movements, peoples, and governments that have recently gained independence, that are poor and have problems similar to ours. This is our right. As in our liberation struggle, we will also preserve our own characteristics in building our nation. This is legitimate. But, generally speaking, there is now clear information available on an international level. It is impossible for us not to consider this information. We must follow the characteristics of the international situation. Democracy on the basis of a multiparty system, a constitutional state, and the existence of several currents under a single front.... A democracy built on freedom of thought and expression. In the economic arena, we are going to take a very open approach, in other words, adopt a market economy. On an international plane, we are opting for cooperation with all those who respect our sovereignty. We will focus our efforts on the security and stability of our region and we will endeavor to maintain balanced relations with our neighbors. The SDAR will be a factor for peace, stability, and the development of open and active cooperation with our neighbors and the countries of the world.

#### **Saudi Contributions to Afghan Mujahidin, Refugees**

##### **One Billion Pakistani Rupees Since 1982**

91AE0475A Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic  
25 May 91 p 6

[Article by Salih al-Falih: "Ibn Baz: Assistance to Afghan Mujahidin, One of the Best Pious Deeds, Greatest of Good Works"]

[Text] His Excellency Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ibn-'Abdallah Ibn-Baz, general president of the Offices of Religious Research, Missionary Work, and Guidance, emphasized that aiding the Afghan Mujahidin and refugees is considered a better pious deed and good work than *al-Zakah* [Islamic charity], etc. His excellency cited the exalted and blessed words, "Eschew the frivolous and unpleasant. Devote your money and yourself in God's way. Your humbleness is best for you, if you are knowing."

He explained that because of charitable activities in Islam, the Muslim feels a bond that draws him to his brother, because he feels what his brother feels, and senses his accidents and injuries. In this regard, he stressed that contributions should be sent to the Public Organization to Receive Contributions for the Afghan Mujahidin in Saudi Arabia, or to its accounts in banks as announced, or to the Saudi Relief Committee in Pakistan.

In his speech, his excellency quoted from the report compiled by the Public Organization to Receive Contributions for the Afghan Mujahidin in Riyadh.

#### **Continual Unlimited Efforts**

He explained the continuous efforts that the Organization for Afghan Mujahidin Contributions is making on behalf of the Afghan jihad, and said that he was anxious for them to continue. The total cash amounts remitted to the Mujahidin, before the formation of the Saudi Relief Committee, was 133,926,666 Saudi riyals. As for after the Saudi Relief Committee was formed, a total of SR538,484,489 was sent. This was spent on committee projects on behalf of the Mujahidin and refugees, and other projects.

As regards expenditures for the Mujahidin, they were made in the following two categories:

1. Some of the expenditures were turned over to the Islamic Federation, and from there to Afghan organizations and field commanders inside Afghanistan. There were fees for the convoys' travel and transporting supplies into the interior. This was done with the assistance of Arab Mujahidin, in addition to equipping certain war leaders, and others among their people, in the program of stipulated contributions. Total expenditure for all these items, during the past eight years, was 1,147,000,000 Pakistani rupees.
2. This category includes money disbursed for specific materials in the past eight years, either delivered to the Islamic Federation or to organizations—after the Federation was dissolved—or field commanders, or to the provisional Mujahidin government, where it was disbursed specifically for the needs of the Mujahidin, as follows: 600,000 military uniforms; 803,965 military overcoats; 588,490 sleeping bags; 1,164,000 pairs of shoes; 938,996 pairs of socks; 300,000 tons of clothing; 200,000 caps; 15,000 *qimah* [meaning unknown];



220,000 blankets; 105,000 quilts; 167,632 various food packs; and, 981,650 various supply packs.

Among the decisions that the committee made in the winter of 1990 was to distribute foodstuffs to the Mujahidin and refugees, valued at 82,812,318 Pakistani rupees, equivalent to tens of thousands of bags and cans of sugar, rice, lentils, tea, wheat, flour, beans, and oil.

Moreover, specific materials continued to reach the refugees and Mujahidin during this winter, amounting to 64,995,700 rupees, equivalent to hundreds of thousands of overcoats, sleeping bags, shoes, blankets, quilts, and some tents, as well as wheelchairs. This was aside from disbursements for health and educational projects, schools for orphans, cash assistance, workers' salaries, stipends for widows and the handicapped, and aid to build rooms for refugees.

#### Multiple Relief Program for Mujahidin

Concerning the relief program that the organization is undertaking, relief projects for the Mujahidin have been started in Pakistan for several motives, headed by doing right for brothers in God, for these millions that have left their land, through providing for the orphans, caring for martyrs' families, employing the widows and handicapped, building mosques, and providing missionary works, while the Saudi Relief Committee provides food and clothing, builds temporary housing for the refugees, and delivers supply cards to new families, who have not received any supply assistance from the Pakistani government. From time to time, there is coordination with the Pakistani government in this regard. The number of families, who have been assisted with regard to all their needs by the committee, is 1,454, through the Pakistani minister for refugee affairs. During the past year, some of the refugee camps were hit by torrential floods. For its part, the Saudi Relief Committee aided 12,000 families, in coordination with the Pakistani government, and the committee is still giving monthly support to them.

The report gave the total amount of specific aid given to the refugees over the past eight years, since the establishment of the Relief Committee, as follows: large construction projects for mosques and schools, as well as building 900,000 inhabitable tents; supplying 322,766 quilts, and 2,500,000 blankets; supplying 258,480 men's suits, 377,060 women's dresses, and 382,977 items of children's clothing; providing 257,877 pairs of shoes, 512,430 various items of clothing, and 477,700 meters of fabrics; and, providing 2,917,018 various kinds of supply packs. The committee also built rooms for refugees families. The number of rooms that the Relief Committee built, during the last eight years, totals 25,797, at a cost of 28,494,200 Pakistani rupees. The committee also provided potable water, by means of tanker trucks, to those who were in need, in addition to digging ordinary wells close to mosques that the committee—for the most part—has built, which can be used for ablutions, and for the needs of those living in the area of the mosque. Some 171 ordinary wells were dug in

various refugee camps, with a cost per well of SR5,000. The committee also had six artesian wells dug at a cost of SR100,000 per well. These wells were usually dug in the middle of large camps.

#### Educational and Cultural Programs

With regard to the fields of education, enlightenment, and culture, the committee gave it high priority and, within its available resources, has initiated projects, inasmuch as this is one of the most important fields in which the committee could offer services to the refugees, along with health, food, and clothing, in view of the fact that God chose to martyr many of their teachers and intellectuals during the long years of continuous and grinding warfare.

The percentage of childbearing has increased greatly, out of proportion to the services being offered to these children, especially the orphans of martyrs. The number of persons who have sought refuge in Pakistan total approximately 3.5 million. Accordingly, the committee opened several schools that take in orphans, in order to achieve two main goals—support orphans, and support the families of martyrs. In order for the orphan to study in the school, he is provided with his needs, in addition to support money, which is paid to the guardian of each orphan, both to support the orphan, and his family. Among the education projects that have been implemented so far are 14 schools for orphans, in which the teaching of the Arabic language is being stressed, so that they will be able to learn about their Islamic heritage, and facilitate a true understanding of the Koran and sunnah. The committee has appointed school teachers, of whom two or three are Arab, and to whom their religious and moral upbringing is entrusted.

The committee has opened four schools for Koranic memorization. The first—Dar al-Qur'an al-Karim—in Peshawar has so far graduated 164 Koranic *huffaz* [a person who knows the Koran by heart], who have also mastered Koranic recitation. There are three other memorization schools located in refugee camps. Preparations are currently underway to open a new, large school for Koranic memorization and religious education.

Furthermore, a vocational school has been opened for orphans, for the purpose of providing them with training for the trades available to them, as a source of livelihood, including tailoring, carpentry, ironwork, shoe making, weaving blankets, tent making, electricians, mechanics, and construction work. The committee gives specific assistance to schools of organizations, or any school that shelters refugee children, including quilts, blankets, clothes, shoes, and foodstuffs.

The Saudi Relief Committee has also tried to choose curricula, in which they have confidence. The Islamic University in Medina has contributed, by allowing four university professors to work with the Relief Committee to supervise its schools and prepare their curricula. The committee has completed preparing the elementary curriculum. It will also distribute these programs to schools



that want to use them, including elementary schools belonging to other organizations or relief agencies. In addition, the committee is devising courses to teach Arabic to Afghan refugee children, as well as courses in *al-da'wah* [Islamic missionary work], in cooperation with the Imam Muhammad Ibn-Sa'ud Islamic University.

#### Social Welfare

In the social welfare arena, the Saudi Relief Committee cares for the handicapped, who lost limbs because of the jihad. Most of them are unable to work, which gives them priority. In terms of social welfare, the committee has provided wheelchairs, and has given artificial limbs to needy persons, as well as supplying crutches. The committee has so far provided 100 wheelchairs, at a cost of 2,300 to 2,500 Pakistani rupees each, as well as artificial limbs for 4,565 handicapped persons, as of the end of 1990. Regarding the handicapped who cannot pursue certain jobs, the committee is training them on certain trades, so that they can earn a living by using their hands, including tailoring, tent-making, spinning, and shoemaking. The organization is trying to find job opportunities for them, while the committee has been paying monthly salaries to those unable to work. The committee has limited the handicapped stipend to SR2,500 per year.

A third group, presently being assisted by the Saudi Relief Committee, is composed of widows. The committee is preparing them for job opportunities in the fields of sewing ladies' dresses, and quilt making. It has also bought sewing machines for them, in addition to paying them monthly salaries, within the program of stipulated contributions. The committee has allocated the sum of 1,500 riyals as a widow's stipend for a period of six months.

#### During 1990-1991 30 Million Dollars

91AE0475B Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 2 Jun 91 p 3

[Article: "Thirty Million Riyals in Citizen Contributions Sent to Afghan Mujahidin; Public Organization Appeals for Contributions to Continue to Support the Mujahidin"]

[Text] The Public Organization to Receive Contributions for Afghan Mujahidin has transferred to the account of the Saudi Relief Committee in Pakistan, during this year, two batches of contributions totaling \$20 million.

The organization's total balance for the last period was 38,062,500 Saudi riyals, which was transferred on 1 June 1991 to the committee's account.

Therefore, the total amount transferred during the year 1990- 1991, as of 1 June 1991, was more than \$30 million.

This was reported in a statement by the Public Organization for Afghan Mujahidin Contributions.

The organization commended the response from the charitable citizens of this country, and those who reside here, and their sentiments that spring from their belief in their obligations toward their Mujahidin brothers and the Afghan refugees.

The organization appealed to the citizens and residents to continue their support for their brothers.

#### Statement from the Head of the Public Organization to Receive Contributions for Afghan Mujahidin, Salman Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz

Praise be to God, Peace be upon His Prophet, etc.

In view of the response from the charitable sons of this great country, and those who reside here, and their sentiments that spring from their belief in their obligations toward their Mujahidin brothers and the Afghan refugees, praiseworthy efforts are being made by the organization's representatives on the Saudi Relief Committee, which is working there on a continual basis among the Mujahidin and refugees, ascertaining their needs, bandaging their wounds, caring for their orphans, teaching them, taking care of their widows and handicapped, and assisting them in various relief, educational, health, and social areas, as well as providing their requirements in terms of vital facilities.

The Saudi Relief Committee, which is subordinate to this organization, has been in the field for more than eight years, and has acquired vast expertise with regard to the conditions of the Mujahidin and refugees, their needs, and ways of providing them with assistance, which has made it able to prioritize in accordance with a well-thought out program.

Because of all of this, the good people's response should be to continue to send their contributions and charity offerings to the offices of the Public Organization to Receive Contributions for the Afghan Mujahidin, or to deposit them in the accounts announced for this purpose, whose code symbol has been unified to 99.

The organization's total balance for the last period was SR38,062,500 which, today, was transferred in its entirety to the Saudi Relief Committee's account in Pakistan, to enable it to continue its work, pay for its projects, and give all it can to the Mujahidin and refugees.

It is worth noting that two batches of contributions have been sent this year, totaling \$20 million and, therefore, the total sent for the year 1990-1991, as of 1 June 1991, was more than \$30 million. By announcing that, the organization wishes to appeal to citizens and residents to support their brothers, as was stated in God's blessed and holy words: "Who is it that will offer to Allah a goodly gift, so He multiplies it to him manifold?" In Mustafa's words: "Those who equip one who fights on God's behalf, has fought, and those people who back him with good works, have fought." We pray God that He



grant our prayer, strengthen Islam and the Muslims, and bring victory to the Mujahidin in His path everywhere.

### **Saudi Petrolube To Build Factory in Egypt**

91AA0533C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
15 Jul 91 p 10

[Article by Muhammad al-Sallum: "Saudi-Egyptian Committee To Meet in October; Agreement on Petrolube Projects in Egypt"]

[Excerpt] Riyadh—AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—It has been agreed that Petrolube Company, a subsidiary of the Saudi (SMARC) Corporation, will build a number of oil factories in Egypt.

This has been stated by Qasim al-Misri, Egypt's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who has lauded the Egyptian-Saudi economic cooperation, pointing out that Saudi Arabia has been among the first countries to support Egypt, not only by canceling its debts but also through economic aid for Egypt during the Gulf crisis, considering that Saudi Arabia advanced Egypt a grant of \$500 million.

At a press conference he held in Riyadh, the Egyptian ambassador said that it has been decided to convene the Joint Saudi-Egyptian Committee next October in Riyadh and that this meeting will be preceded by a preparatory meeting in Cairo.

The ambassador also noted a number of projects between the two countries, including a project to operate a direct marine line to link Egypt's Nuwaybi' Port with the Northern Saudi Oil Field Port and the Saudi Daba Port with the Egyptian Safajah Port. He said that the project for a land bridge between the two countries is still in the phase of research because it is a big project that is subject to feasibility studies. [passage omitted]

### **Syria, Egypt To Cooperate in Several Industries**

91AA0569A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
28 Jul 91 p 9

[Article: "Egyptian-Syrian Company for Manufacture of Investment Equipment"]

[Text] AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned from economic sources that an agreement will soon be concluded between Egypt and Syria to establish a joint stock company to manufacture investment equipment. An official source at the Egyptian Ministry of Industry told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that industrial cooperation between the two countries shall include the manufacture of electric cables, steam boilers, metal frames, glass, bathroom fixtures, lenses, tractors, and trucks.

On the other hand, Syria and Egypt have decided to exchange processed and semi-processed materials, coordinate the purchase of raw materials, and market ready-made products with focus on the textile industry and the mineral, engineering, and electronic industries.

### **Lebanese-Syrian Economic Relations Discussed**

91AE0506A Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 20 May 91 p 5

[Article by 'Adnan al-Hajj: "Lebanese-Syrian Economic Relations in Light of the Brotherhood and Cooperation Treaty: Thoughts on Promoting Trade and Lifting Restrictions; on Import Permits; and on Visas. The Lebanese Propose a Common Market and Call for Relaxing Capital Transfers"]

[Text] The Lebanese-Syrian Treaty on Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination, recently ratified by the Council of Ministers, calls for formalizing economic relations between the two countries. The issue has been pending, or partially implemented, since the joint trade accord was signed in 1953.

The treaty stipulates the creation of a ministerial commission of the ministers of economy and trade in the two countries, to work out trade specifics under conditions of favored treatment.

Lebanese minister of economy and trade Marwan Hammadah has been in contact with his Syrian counterpart, Dr. Muhammad al-Imadi, in order to arrive at an acceptable draft on trade and economic draft. They have exchanged rudimentary proposals, including recommendations advanced by Lebanese economic and producing enterprises and the Syrian response to them.

AL-SAFIR learned that Lebanon's proposals went beyond Syria's, calling for a Lebanese-Syrian common market and for open borders to the products of both countries while the Syrians were constrained by their established economic system. AL-SAFIR also learned that minister Hammadah will bring the following new proposals to the negotiating table:

1. Amend the trade accord between the two countries in order to boost trade.

This means that trade would no longer be limited to the goods listed under the 1953 accord and which have come to account nowadays for some 5 percent of tradeable goods.

2. Allow the importation [from Lebanon] of all goods and products imported by Syria even if not specifically listed by agreement.

3. Endeavor to rescind import-export permits without prejudicing established systems in the two countries, and to abolish tariffs on certain traded goods and products.

4. Guarantee the free movement of capital and labor between the two countries and abrogate emergency laws that impede such movement.

Promote and safeguard each country's investment in the other within established frameworks.



5. Provide businessmen with residency and housing facilities and abolish border crossing visas in favor of joint identity cards as previously agreed, but not yet implemented.

6. Facilitate transportation and transit in both directions in order to promote the flow of goods from both countries. Target the integration of shipping conveyances by organizing overland shipping in accordance with market demand.

7. Create a joint authority to oversee railway roads in both countries.

8. Promote cooperation in the air by developing common routes and offering special incentives to Lebanese and Syrian travelers on the airlines of both countries.

9. Coordinate foreign exchange activity in order to minimize speculation against the Syrian lira in Beirut markets.

10. Bolster tourist relations by undertaking joint projects and facilitating tourist travel between the two countries.

11. Oversee the implementation of agreed measures through a permanent economic organization to be created under the joint commission composed of the ministers of economy and trade of the two countries. This organization would function much like the permanent authority created in 1970 to deal with common concerns but was unable to solve problems or resolve issues remain pending to this day.

The Lebanese side has also offered proposals dealing with finance companies, joint transportation companies, and the development of water and electric energy.

### Historical Relations

It is recognized that Lebanese-Syrian relations have passed five major milestones, the latest being the current agreement between the two countries. Initially, this agreement will be only partially implemented in view of the accumulation of unresolved issues and continued conflict over them. The five milestones are:

1. The period of the French mandate period when [Syrian-Lebanese] relations took the form of a full economic and customs union.

Under the mandate, Lebanon and Syria formed a single economic region with integrated customs and uniform tariffs.

Furthermore, they entered into joint trade accords with the outside world, issued banknotes through the same bank, and enjoyed total freedom in the movement of labor and capital between them.

2. The period of "Mutual Interests and Customs Union Agreement" which was signed in October 1943 after the two countries gained independence.

Prior to being handed economic control by the mandating power, the countries signed an agreement in Damascus that defined action on mutual interests for an indefinite period of time.

The Damascus agreement of 43 called for the formation of a Supreme Council on Mutual Interests empowered to draft bills that would have the force of law on approval by the councils of ministers in each of the two countries.

The agreement stipulated that Lebanon and Syria would be an integrated customs union where goods enjoy complete freedom of movement and from customs duties and taxes.

The accord also stipulated the distribution of common interest resources on the basis of 56 percent for Syria and 44 percent for Lebanon. It gave itself a life span of two years to be automatically renewed unless otherwise requested by one of the parties six months before the end of the term.

3. The period of the Shatawrah Agreement of 8 July 1949. That agreement was reached after the "Mutual Interests and Customs Union Agreement" stumbled because of divergent developmental and economic philosophies.

Syria had reacted to a currency problem with unilateral measures which Lebanon considered to be antithetic to the customs union in effect. The Syrian measures banned the entry of pharmaceuticals from Lebanon into Syria and of wheat and grains from Syria into Lebanon. They also commanded Syrian importers to use the port at Latakia instead of Beirut.

In addition, Syria demanded parity of currency with Lebanon.

Long and difficult negotiations ended in recognition that a new agreement was needed to address those pressing issues and to articulate economic relations.

Agreement was reached on 8 July 1949 to standardize domestic fees and to protect Syrian produce through customs levies on imported wheat and barley. It was also agreed to protect Syrian rice by bringing Egyptian rice under regular customs charges; to protect Syrian industry with higher duty on cotton and silk thread and fabric; and to pledge joint and effective measures to remove Syrian and Lebanese currency disparities.

When the Syrians failed to honor their commitment to liberalize wheat exports to Lebanon, the Lebanese reacted by suspending measures for uniform domestic fees.

4. The period of economic estrangement and customs separation. Economic alienation resulted from the refusal of both parties to abide by the 49 agreement and the Lebanese Council of Ministers rejected a proposal for full economic integration with Syria. The Syrian Council of Ministers consequently met on 13 Mar 50 and issued a statement of economic estrangement with Lebanon.



The end result is that pending issues are accumulating to this day with practically no attempt at resolution.

A bid was made in 1952 to heal the alienation and negotiations were held at Shatawrah. However, the one-year accord reached in February 1952 was never renewed. Its failure is attributed to the Syrian government's legislative decree No.151 which restricted the activity of Lebanese merchants whose commercial dominance Syria considered an abridgement of its economic rights.

Legislative decree No. 151 also effectively deactivated Lebanese financial houses and commercial centers in Syria. Those establishments had held a majority of foreign company agencies and branches in aviation, commerce, and industry.

### Contemporary Relations

Economic relations between Lebanon and Syria are currently governed by agreement reached 5 March 1953 which was renewed more than once and amended on 8 October 1968.

Among the major provisions of that accord:

1. Full liberalization of trade in agricultural produce and exemption from customs duties and other restrictions.
2. Four appendices to the accord list Syrian and Lebanese industrial products that are either exempted from customs duties or granted reductions of 25 and 50 percent when traded by the two countries. The appendices also list certain industrial products not fully exempt from customs duties.
3. The accord allows either party, provided the other is so notified, to mandate export-import licensing of agricultural produce for reasons of agricultural policy.
4. Traded products are exempt from domestic fees, except for municipal charges.
- 5.[Goods in] transit are to be facilitated and exempted from customs duties and port fees.
6. The agreement stipulates the creation of a joint commission of representatives of the ministries of economy and trade, industry, foreign affairs, customs, and agrarian reform in both countries [as published]. The commission is charged by Article 12 of the accord with reviewing proposed amendments and looking into the grievances of the parties.
7. Fully or partially exempt goods are to carry certificates of origin issued by the competent government agencies. The local labor and raw material content of such goods must amount to at least 40 percent of the total cost of production.

Three letters of understanding are appended to the agreement.

In the first, the Syrian government pledges more latitude for Syrians wishing to relocate to Lebanon.

The second letter allows both parties to take protectionist measures if a minimum of uniform customs regulations is not adopted.

The third letter provides for future talks on transit [re-exports] and the crossing of shipment carriers into both countries.

### Non-Performance

Obstacles frustrated implementation of the Lebanese-Syrian commercial accord for long periods of time. One problem was the absence of a permanent Lebanese committee and the consequent failure of the Lebanese to follow up on the agreement and develop it. Another problem was caused by decree No. 1941 issued by the Syrian government in 1982 to ban the importation of Lebanese goods and products lest Syrian markets be infiltrated by Israeli goods.

That decree was abrogated by Syrian authorities last year and the 1953 agreement was reinstated.

Syrian officials, however, went beyond the 1953 agreement in developing and promoting trade relations by consenting to reciprocal transactions and by removing barriers and allowing the importation of goods not listed in the appendices.

The augmented Lebanese delegation that visited Damascus last year was assured by Syrian prime minister Mahmud al-Zu'bi of "Syrian willingness to support all efforts to bolster economic relations between the two countries and that trade opportunities are unlimited, especially in the area of reciprocal transactions."

Al-Zu'bi pointed out that Syrian authorities "went beyond the 1953 economic agreement between the two countries by allowing the importation of all permissible Lebanese goods even if they were not listed in the appendices to the agreement, asserting [sic] that the competent authorities were instructed to provide all possible facilities to ensure the success of mutual and other transaction.

And yet, a \$5 million reciprocal transaction remains unfulfilled to this day due to the lack of Lebanese follow-up and the consequent absence of an implementation mechanism even though agreement was already reached on the method of payment, which is the most critical component. Each importer, it was decided, would pay for his goods at the central bank in his own country and leave account settlement to the two central banks of Lebanon and Syria.

### The Trade Balance

The Syrian-Lebanese trade balance, which titled in favor of Lebanon from 1974 to 1988, indicates that Syrian markets attract considerable volumes of Lebanese exports. Accurate trade figures are lacking for the years



1989 and 1990 but state and corporate imports of Syrian petroleum products may have swung the trade balance in favor of Syria for those two years.

As a result, economic voices are rising in Lebanon to call for promoting the trade agreement and for establishing joint free trade zones. There is even a call for a Lebanese-Syrian common market since Syria represents a significant market for Lebanese products. It is common knowledge that Lebanese industrialists and leaders of major private sector economic enterprises have made their

wishes known and have urged the Lebanese government and the Syrians to adopt some form of economic integration.

Competent authorities are now looking into problems pending between Lebanon and Syria as a result of consecutive accords. Such problems include the Transit issue, water projects, Syrian workers in Lebanon, tourism, joint accounts, Lebanese property in Syria, border fees, and the railroad issue.

**Comparison of Syrian-Lebanese Trade for the 1974-1990 Period**  
(in \$million)

Year	Lebanese Exports to Syria	Lebanese Imports from Syria	Trade Balance
1974	87.5	57.8	+29.7
1975	61.1	8.8	+52.3
1976	41.6	7.2	+34.4
1977	55.8	24.1	31.7
1978	65.0	10.0	+55.0
1979	76.7	21.5	+55.2
1980	128.62	13.9	+114.72
1981	109.71	35.1	+74.61
1982	108.77	23.8	+84.97
1983	103.92	26.2	+77.72
1984	136.62	13.8	+122.82
1985	85.84	4.3	+81.54
1986	76.48	15.4	+61.08
1987	31.07	11.6	-20.1
1988	121.32	56.1	+65.22
1989	41.0	N.A.	—
1990	49.0	N.A.	—

Sources:

Exports:Chamber of Commerce and Industry Statistics (80-88)

Imports:International Monetary Fund Statistics

Exports (74-80):International Monetary Fund

### Interaction of Lebanese, Syrian Economies Noted

91AE0505B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic  
15 Jul 91 p 11

[Report from Damascus by Fayiz Sarah: "Syrian Goods and Manpower to Lebanon; Damascus Anticipates Lebanese Investments at Later Date"]

[Text] Three observations are noted on crossing the Syrian-Lebanese border checkpoint at al-Masna'.

Most of the travellers to Lebanon are Syrian Arabs. Their numbers are so great that they almost expunge the features of any others wanting or needing to cross into Lebanon through that checkpoint.

A second observation is the noticable presence of Syrian workers in their distinctive garb, spread about at several points in the Bika' along the major routes that connect al-Masna' with Beirut via Shtawrah. Their presence can also be felt in several districts of the Lebanese capital.

Also to be observed is that Syrian commodities and goods are widely available in Lebanese markets everywhere, be they in Shtawrah, Tarabulus, or Beirut.

Counterbalancing the flow of Syrian labor and goods into Lebanon, the Syrians feel an distinct Lebanese presence in Damascus, as well as in Hims and Tartus in the governorates adjacent to the Syrian-Lebanese border. The Lebanese arrive on day trips to shop at the markets of those cities, especially on weekends. Lebanese



goods—or at least goods originating in Lebanese markets—are available in many areas of Syria. Many Lebanese have been living and working in Syria for years.

Lebanese sources assert that some of the phenomena along the Syrian-Lebanese border are nothing new, since they date back to before the 1975 civil war in Lebanon. What is new is the volume and the degree to which they have grown. Such growth is attributable, in part, to improved security in Lebanon, to the return of normal life in Lebanon, and to considerable Syrian-Lebanese efforts to promote the flow of goods and people.

The Lebanese observe—and the Syrians concur—that those phenomena are an indication of the continued and permanent flow of goods and people across the border despite waxing and waning caused by various political and economic fluctuations in Syrian-Lebanese relations. The flow never ceased, but it did increase in relaxed times and slowed down when there was tension between the two countries.

#### **From Phenomena to Facts**

Let us now move from phenomena to facts. Figures indicate that Lebanese exports to Syria amounted to \$57.8 million in 1974, vis-a-vis imports from Syria valued at \$57.8 million [as published]. The volume of trade between the two countries vacillated with circumstances. Lebanese exports to Syria were valued at \$121.2 million in 1988 compared with \$56.1 million in imports from Syria.

Official figures, however, do not reflect the true movement of goods between the two countries because two factors are not taken into account—the considerable volume and value of goods carried by passengers who daily cross the border in both directions; and the smuggling of goods in both directions. Smuggled goods are impossible to estimate, but various sources indicate that they are of considerable volume and of great value.

Likewise, official figures are not truly reflective of the movement of people. The number of Syrian workers in Lebanon came close to half a million in the seventies before it started to shrink with the progress of the Lebanese civil war. There is now a total absence of such statistics.

The realities surrounding the movement of goods in both directions and of the flow of Syrian workers into Lebanon reflect the sum total of Syrian-Lebanese economic relations, which have an old and diverse history. Several attempts at managing the various aspects of those relations were made since the two countries gained independence in the forties. Success was achieved in certain areas but not in others. Issues debated included trade; joint water resources; transportation, transit, and tourism; Lebanese property in Syria; joint accounts; labor; the railroads; etc.

Such issues most frequently appear on Syrian-Lebanese agendas whenever bilateral relations improve. Serious

attempts have been made since the beginning of this year to deal with the political dimensions of economic relations within the framework of a \$10 million comprehensive reciprocal trade agreement worked out last February by the Syrian and Lebanese ministers of economy, who put forth practical proposals for improving relations. The effort took a more comprehensive and serious bent after the Syrian-Lebanese treaty was signed last May. The Lebanese side has proposed joining a common market with Syria and opening the borders to the products of both countries. The Syrians, in turn, avowed relentless effort to develop economic relations between the two countries.

In this atmosphere of mutual desire to bolster economic relations and address pending problems, unresolved issues began to appear on the agenda of the ministerial commission formed under the "Brotherhood and Cooperation Treaty". The commission is composed of Lebanese Minister of Economy and Trade Marwan Hamadah and his Syrian counterpart, Minister of Economy and External Trade Dr. Muhammad al-'Imadi.

Major issues on the joint commission's agenda include updating the trade accord; expanding the volume of trade; abolishing export-import licensing and exempting traded goods from fees; allowing the [free] flow of capital and labor between the two countries, instituting relevant guarantees, and abolishing emergency laws in that regard; providing businessmen and workers with travel and residency facilities; facilitating shipping as well as air and ground transportation; and coordinating foreign exchange operations. Also on the agenda is the creation of a permanent joint organization to oversee the implementation of agreed-upon details.

#### **Mutual Needs**

The multiplicity of important issues on the agenda of the joint economic commission is indicative of Syrian-Lebanese propensity to diligently seek a resolution to pending economic issues and to bolster mutual cooperation. This goes beyond the spirit and provisions of the "Brotherhood and Cooperation Treaty" and of the Ta'if Accord, both of which emphasized favored relations. This goes beyond intentions and deals with the realities of Syrian and Lebanese economies. Both sides need to put certain problems behind them and be propelled on the road to aspired progress.

The Lebanese economy is based on initiative and enjoys special dynamics, but has suffered violent jolts and severe blows since the outbreak of civil war in 1975. It was hit especially [hard] during the Israeli blitzkrieg of 1982 and the consequent destruction of whatever infrastructure remained in the various Lebanese economic sectors [such as] agriculture, industry, and utilities. The invasion also contributed to the emigration of the Lebanese work force and to capital and investment flight.

The Lebanese economy, poised to take off again, will be tangibly impacted by Syria, which is a large market capable of absorbing excess Lebanese production of



goods and wares, or at least a significant portion of that excess. Syria could guarantee a young and "cheap" labor force for Lebanese reconstruction and for the renovation of Lebanese utilities and production facilities. It goes without saying that Syria will be an important factor if Lebanon is to regain its role in the region's transit trade [re-export].

These are the general Lebanese economic requirements. The Syrian economy, by the same token, also has its own needs. In recent years, it has suffered from shortages of such production requirements as liquidity, raw materials, and foreign exchange. The consequent shut-down, partial or complete, of certain production facilities and the decline in product quality has prompted diligent corrective effort by the Syrian Government, which controls primary economic facilities. Initiatives were taken to correct economic shortages and flaws in order to guarantee such requirements as foreign exchange, raw materials, monetary liquidity, and infrastructure renovation. Initiatives towards new investment opportunities in agriculture, industry, and services, including tourism, culminated last May in the passage of the new investment law.

Syria, in its new economic initiative, will naturally look to favored relations with its Lebanese brother. It needs to employ some of its excess or idle labor force and to bring a portion of its products to Lebanese markets either to meet local demand or to be re-exported—a process with which Lebanon has familiarity. It won't be long, according to economic forecasts, before Lebanese investments come to Syria.

Favored relations between Lebanon and Syria would guarantee the Syrian economy something else essential—the restoration of initiative and dynamism depleted from the Syrian economy under three decades of bureaucratic control.

Mutual need—i.e., that the Syrian and Lebanese economies need each other—is a practical matter that mandates favored economic relations between the two countries. This has found clear expression on both sides of the Syrian-Lebanese treaty, whose economic dimension is undoubtedly a mutual need dictated by practical realities.

### **Syrian-Jordanian Transport Companies' Plans, Budgets**

91AE0517A Amman JORDAN TIMES in English  
15 Jun 91 p 3

[Text] Amman (J.T.)—The Jordanian-Syrian land and maritime transport companies have announced plans for expansion and increased operations in light of revenues and profits made in the past year, and have approved

budgets and endorsed new plans of actions following two days of meetings in Amman.

Prime Minister Mudar Badran voiced the Jordanian government's deep satisfaction with the progress of the work of the two joint companies after hearing a report on their operations in the past year and the profits they made.

"The Jordanian government is determined to bolster scopes of cooperation between Syria and Jordan and to remove all obstacles that could impede the progress of the two companies," said the prime minister at a meeting in his office with Minister of Transport and Telecommunications Jamal al-Sarayirah and his Syrian counterpart Yusef Ahmad. The two ministers co-chaired the general assembly meetings of both companies.

The two ministers concluded the talks by signing minutes of the deliberations covering plans for the future and reviewing the past year's operations and administrative and financial reports.

Mr al-Sarayirah said in a statement, after the signing ceremony, that the maritime company last year made a net profit of 33.5 million Syrian pounds and that the general assembly had decided to purchase a third cargo vessel to boost the company's operations. The new vessel, he said in his statement to Jordan Television, will be put in operation between al-'Aqabah Port and ports in the Far East. The cost of purchasing the ship will be covered by the company's last year reserves.

The general assembly has approved the 1990 accounts and endorsed the budget for 1991. It also gave its consent to the company's operations during 1991 to boost transport between Jordan and Syria, the minister noted.

Referring to the joint land transport company, Mr al-Sarayirah said that the assembly had approved the operational plans for 1991 which entails transporting nearly one million tonnes of various goods within the Kingdom and between Jordan and Syria.

The general assembly has approved the 1991 budget, totalling about 5 million Jordanian dinars (JD), and the final accounts of 1990 which proved that the company made nearly 1 million JD in net profits, Mr al-Sarayirah said.

According to Hisham Asfour, the land transport company general manager, the joint company now owns 362 trucks which carried nearly 1.3 million tonnes of goods in 1990. He said that the company, which employs about 700 workers and drivers, planned to boost its activities in 1991 and 1992. He added, that the joint company, which has a capital of 8 million JD, is determined to exert all efforts to offer services to the people of the two countries.



**Writer Charges West With Anti-Arab Racism**

91AA0562A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
23 Jul 91 pp 34-35

[Article by Fahmi Huwaydi: "New Anti-Arab Racism"]

[Text] There is a new kind of anti-semitism in the West nowadays that is tolerated and welcomed because it is directed against Arabs and Muslims.

Last month, prisons in the capital city of Brussels, Belgium were filled with Arab youths arrested during massive campaigns aimed at preserving "law and order" in the city, as an official government spokesman put it. Police provocations and harassments had prompted a large crowd of Arab residents to demonstrate in the streets, smashing storefronts, throwing gas bombs, and clashing with the police. This demonstration resulted in four serious injuries and the arrest of 200 individuals to be tried, according to a Reuters report that described these incidents as the toughest acts of violence ever experienced in Belgium.

Ever since the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, Belgium has been the most arbitrary country in Europe regarding expelling Arabs. In the first half of this year, close to 5,000 persons were expelled from the country.

Following the outbreak of the Gulf war in mid-January, a police officer in the Czechoslovakian capital, Prague, informed a Palestinian student named Ahmad 'Awdah, age 23, of the decision to deport him. When the student asked the officer for the reason, since he had not been involved in any political action, the officer replied, saying: "Is it not enough that you are killing our children?"

The student was taken aback and asked in surprise: "When and where did we kill your children, sir?"

The officer, while shoving him into the car, said: "You Arabs are killing American soldiers fighting the Gulf war and they are our children and our brothers!"

Meanwhile, an Algerian worker by the name of 'Umar, who lives in a suburb in Corsica, was on his way home from work when two Frenchmen stopped him and accosted him with insults because "Muslims are murderers and savages." When 'Umar tried to respond, one of the Frenchmen pulled out a knife from a small handbag, slashed his belly, and ran away. The following day, the city streets were covered with graffiti saying "Death to the Arabs." Ever since last January, at the very least, clashes with Arabs have been a weekly occurrence in the outskirts of major French cities: Paris, Lyon, Marseilles, and Toulouse. The latest report we have received was about an incident that took place exactly two weeks ago in a Paris suburb during a local celebration when a quarrel broke out in a pavilion between a French visitor and a man of Arab descent. The quarrel evolved into verbal abuse and ended with the

Frenchman going home and returning with a hunting rifle that he fired at the Arab, missing him, but killing his son who was with him!

The Saturday before that mournful evening, an immigrant and a female police officer lost their lives in Monte la Jolie, and the previous Saturday, an Arab immigrant was killed there as well...and so on!

**Arabs as Prospective Terrorists**

Britain, too, witnessed a hostile campaign against the Muslims at the beginning of this year, especially in their major areas of concentration like Manchester, Liverpool, and Birmingham, where incendiary bombs were hurled at three mosques, and a fourth mosque west of London, the oldest mosque in Britain, was also set afire. Police sources reported an attack against Muslims in a town near Bradford in the north of England, calling it an "isolated incident committed by troublemakers."

News agencies quoted Professor Sayyid 'Ali Ashraf, director of the Islamic Academy in Cambridge, as saying that the National Front, which includes many white bigots who hate foreigners, Arabs and Muslims in particular, was responsible for such attacks. This group follows the example of the French National Front, headed by the notorious racist Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Mushir 'Azzam, former chairman of the Council of Mosques in Bradford, told reporters that the Gulf war has unmasked the anti-Muslim elements in Britain. He also said that these white bigots believe that just because they are fighting Muslims in Iraq, all Muslims in Britain are their enemies. They are organizing incessant attacks against the Muslims to terrorize them and eventually drive them out of the country.

The campaign against Arabs and Muslims was not confined to these bigoted groups. The British authorities themselves have taken similar arbitrary measures against everyone. As part of what was considered "preventive measures," some Arabs were ordered to submit to the house arrest system, in which they were required to report daily to police stations and were prohibited from leaving their homes and residences without police permission. Other Arabs, most of whom were Iraqi students, were taken to a detention camp in Wilston (west of London) which, according to press reports, is a camp built in an isolated area and surrounded with barbed wire. Camp inmates were not allowed to listen to the radio, watch television, or read newspapers!

Some British circles have criticized such behavior, and it was reported that Foreign Office advisors protested the Home Office measures. In its 6 February issue, the newspaper INDEPENDENT posed the following question: "Should we, as a consequence of a short war, lose the long-term peace in the future?"



The same problem has been repeated in the United States. Last February, the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee announced that acts of violence and harassment against Arab-Americans had increased considerably since the outbreak of the Gulf war. The committee had recorded 100 such acts within the last seven months. This committee was formed when it was noted that every time an incident against foreigners took place in the Middle East, Arab-Americans were subjected to harm and persecution, for they became the object of telephone threats, "bodily harm," and vandalism.

During the Gulf crisis, Pan American Airlines announced that it would not allow Iraqis (most of those who live in America are against the Iraqi regime in Baghdad) to fly on its planes, but when an Iraqi subject brought suit against the company, Pan American decided to allow people with dual American-Iraqi citizenship or green card holders to fly on its planes, but no one else.

Moreover, tens of thousands of young people of Arab descent were summoned to FBI field offices, where they were asked about their feelings toward the Gulf war and what they would do should the war become more widespread. The strangest statement in this regard came from FBI Director William Sessions, who said that those Arabs included potential terrorists, to which an Asian-American responded, saying: "I have never in my life heard nor read in any law book about a prospective criminal or a prospective terrorist!"

#### **Why Is Public Opinion Silent?**

Thus, in a flash, Muslim Arabs have been turned into prospective criminals or prospective terrorists or presumed criminals and terrorists until proven otherwise!

I read a commentary on the latest racist phenomenon sweeping the West in which the writer compared the old anti-Semitism, which specializes in anti-Jewish incitement, and the new anti-Semitism, which is devoted to hatred of the Arabs. In his comparison between the two attitudes, the writer, Mr. Raghib al-Sulh, a Lebanese researcher at the British Oxford University, said in his article published in AL-HAYAH newspaper (13 April issue):

"The old anti-Semitism, which is directed at the Jews, peaked during the Hitler regime that the international community fought and defeated, eradicating its intellectual and material mainstays. Ever since the defeat of Nazism, hostility to Jews has been considered a crime in some advanced countries, particularly Germany, the birthplace of Nazism. Within this framework, we can understand, for instance, the law recently passed by the British authorities providing for the pursuit and punishment of Nazis living in Britain for war crimes committed against the Jews. The torture the Jews had to endure has sensitized humanity to the need to make special efforts to combat hostility to Jews and to protect them from harm.

"Conversely, we find that the protection of the Semite Arabs and the defense of their security and rights is hardly the concern of any power, big or small. The Arabs stand alone, without a friend or ally, in their confrontation with the anti-Semites who find them an easier target for their hostility. "The traditional anti-Semitism directed at the Jews in the West has receded into small organizations and marginal tendencies such as the neo-Nazi and neo-Fascist parties that sometimes commit some negative acts against the Jews to express their anti-Semitic leanings. But, in so doing, they come up against a wide solid wall of political rejection and popular condemnation of their actions. When anti-Jewish individuals last year desecrated the Jewish cemetery in the village of Carpentras in southern France, this action was met with the broadest forms of condemnation. About a quarter of a million French men and women went out in a massive demonstration in Paris, condemning anti-Semitism and hostility toward Jews. The demonstration was led by President Francois Mitterand; most French political party leaders; and preeminent Christian, Muslim, and Jewish clerics, in whose name the then prime minister Michel Rocard stated that all France condemned the criminals who desecrated death and rejected anti-Semitism and hostility toward Jews. In Carpentras itself, a small demonstration, led by a former interior minister and three other ministers wearing the Jewish yarmulke, took to the streets to express solidarity with the Jews. Behind them walked Catholic bishops and mosque imams to proclaim their outrage at the prophets of hatred and purveyors of violence and malice against the Jews. Just about the same time, Christian and Jewish clerics from 16 countries met in Prague to declare in the strongest possible terms their opposition to hostility toward Jews and their determination to combat anything remotely related to it. The media was full of articles and positions sympathetic to the Jews, reaffirming respect for their religious and human rights."

Compared to these episodes and attitudes, we find that attacks on Arabs are not met with the same massive reactions or immense political and popular outrage, but rather with fleeting and diffident sympathetic positions by limited organizations and bodies standing on the periphery of public life. When French paratroopers attacked an area inhabited by Moroccan immigrants in the city of Carcassonne in southern France, committing assault and battery against residents there, the matter was hastily brought to rest after a summary investigation and the adoption of simple disciplinary measures against the paratroopers. When racists assassinate an Arab immigrant in Italy, France, or Greece, competent authorities view the matter as an "isolated incident." They do not bother to look for the underlying reasons nor do they demonstrate any serious interest in combating the political and moral climate that leads to such a crime. In all the cases where Arabs have been killed with anti-Semitic bullets, we have not seen the symbols of the



ruling political elite walking in the victim's funeral to express their unified opposition to hostility toward the Arabs.

Thus, the Arabs have become an easy target, as the saying goes, for anti-Semites can hunt Arabs without arousing public opinion and without clashing with its key agencies. Those who have had to back off because of the risks involved in attacking Jews can now give free rein to their anti-Semitic feelings and practice their rites until they are inebriated so long as their wrath is directed at Arabs. It is so easy for anti-Semites to hide behind civilizational veils and slip into the ranks of humanitarians, democrats, liberals, and progressives when they single out the Arabs for their incendiary sentiments. It is also so easy for European anti-Semites to slip into political front positions in their communities, so long as they bear the banner of anti-Arabism, the banner that grants its bearers absolution and provides them with a certificate of good conduct and an act of faith in the homeland!

#### Anti-Islamic Sensitivity

As important as this testimony is, I believe that the matter goes beyond the bounds of anti-Semitism that is hostile toward a specific race or "ethnic group," namely the Arabs. There are many indications that hatred is directed at the Arabs, not only because they are Arabs, but because they are Muslims as well. Indeed, I do believe that the sensitivity many sectors in the West have is basically aimed against the Muslims, be they Arab or non-Arab.

To be more precise, ever since the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, there have been continuous discussions in countless writings, seminars, and conferences about a renewed "Islamic danger" threatening the West and its interests. The vicious Western campaign against Islam waged at the beginning of 1990 during the crisis generated by Salman Rushdi's book, *Satanic Verses*, is still fresh in the minds of people. Indeed, we must note that during the recent Gulf crisis some mosques in Britain were blown up and set afire and some Muslim leaders received death threats, even though most British Muslims are not Arabs, but rather from the Indian sub-continent. The same thing is true in Germany and the various other north European countries, where the greatest percentage of Muslims are Turkish and a smaller percentage Kurdish. Neither the Turks nor the Kurds are Arabs, and yet they have not escaped oppression and persecution. If we were to accept the explanation that the persecution of those living in France, most of whom are Moroccans, springs from a deep-rooted hostility toward the Semitic race by certain racist groups, how can we explain the persecution of Pakistanis, Indians, Bengalese, Turks, and Kurds? Besides, how can this hostility toward the Arabs in France, who are considered Semites, be reconciled with the sweeping popular support and sympathy accorded to Israel with its Semitic Jews?

The same question can be raised about the persecution of Arab Semites and the boundless hospitality to the Israeli Semites in the United States?

The analysis Mr. al-Sulh set forth may be adequate to explain one aspect of the phenomenon, but is not enough to explain all of it. Accordingly, it can be said that hostility toward the Semitic race is one reason for the racist tendency that has recently intensified in the West, and hostility toward Islam is another reason that cannot be minimized in any way. Perhaps I do not exaggerate when I say that hostility toward Arabs embodies, in its essence, hostility toward Islam that the Western mind and conscience has been harboring since the Crusades. The Western intellect, the academic one included, uses the words "Arab" and "Muslim" interchangeably, with the idea that everything that is Arab is Muslim and vice-versa, if not in the ideological sense, then by cultural standards, at least. For they are all either "Mohammedans" or children of the Islamic culture.

The European parliament discussed this issue after one of its committees conducted a study on it. Whereas the committee affirmed that racist and anti-Semitic groups did not pose a great danger now and that their ascendancy to power was farfetched, some members of the European parliament recalled the Nazi experience, when many people underestimated the movement when it emerged in the thirties, only to be surprised by it evolving into a danger that terrorized the entire European continent.

The European parliament adopted its committee's appeal in its report to issue an anti-racial discrimination charter and to compel the European countries to implement its articles and contents.

On another level, the French Parliament has been presented with another anti-racial discrimination plan prepared by the "Urban Ministry" formed by President Mitterrand, aimed at, among other things, easing the racial tension that has erupted in France and working toward coexistence and the integration of the indigenous and immigrant populations. According to Urban Ministry officials, the plan seeks to resolve the problem from two angles, financial and architectural. By this, the immigrants' economic crisis would be alleviated through a more equitable distribution of income that would allow them to live in decent residential areas without any material or psychological barriers between them and their surrounding community.

In conclusion, we deem it necessary to raise this question: "Where does our Arab and Islamic world stand on this subject?" We have read that Libya has protested to Belgium the bad treatment of the five North African countries' nationals and that the Belgian charge d'affaires to Tripoli had been summoned to the Libyan Foreign Ministry where he was handed a message to this effect.



This, however, does not exclude the questions: Where is the Arab League? Where is the Islamic Conference Organization?

The comparison between the earlier persecution of Jews and the later persecution of Arabs has excluded an important factor, namely that the Jews have evidence to protect them, to defend their rights, and, indeed, to take their revenge.

As for the Arabs and Muslims, they only have God to give them justice in the hereafter, if they are worthy of it, of course!

### Changes in Islamic Thought Discussed by Writer

91AA0570A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic  
30 Jul 91 p 7

[Article by Fahmi Huwaydi: "Latest Aspect of the Islamic Phenomenon"; italicized words as published]

[Text] It took almost an hour for me to explain to a Japanese journalist that Islamic fundamentalists have some bad people among them, but that newspapers' statements about them are not information or reports, but are merely points of view on that subject. You hunted for one aspect of the truth, and you saw only that!

It is obvious that I am forced to reaffirm that "discovery" in a "second speech for the defense" after having been pursued all week long by a question, reiterated by some of those who read last Tuesday's (23 July) article, in which I said that Islamic fundamentalists are men like any other men. They include the pious and the wicked, moderates and extremists. The essence of the question was: Where are the moderates, and why don't we see them?

The question is legitimate, and what I have learned from questions and impressions on this is tantamount to additional indications confirming that the picture painted of the Islamic condition is different from reality.

The error was that I meant an assessment of the groups themselves on the Islamic scene. I stopped at the ideas themselves, did not go beyond them, did not view them and consequently, they were not assessed as to subsequent development in those groups, or as ideas. Therefore, there was both a deficiency and a distortion at the same time.

Egypt's program embodies what we are talking about. Intellectuals specifically investigating the Islamic phenomenon always focus on the traditional and historic aspect of the Islamic movement, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in the twenties; or on the angry and discordant groups which emerged in the well-known circumstances of the seventies, and are basically represented by the Jihad groups and the Islamic Group. Perhaps I should also mention the so-called *al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah* [Repudiation and Renunciation] Group, which has disappeared from the

scene. None of these investigators assess the features of the big Islamic scene, which falls outside these limits, while that scene itself witnessed, after the Nasirist phase especially, very positive and important developments and reactions. Because of the political and legal ramifications that prevented embodying these reactions in political or cultural groups, one of the enlightening aspects of the Islamic phenomenon has continued to be absent or concealed from the authorized political charts, as well as from public awareness as a whole. The most that has emerged on that aspect has been a group of people submitting weighty papers and studies on the wealth of Islamic culture in its various fields.

I know that some will shrug their shoulders, saying that the their goals are the same and, consequently, there is no difference nor anything new in this regard. That is a hasty simplification, because when the matter pertains to social and political change, the means are no less important than the goals. Sometimes, the means are more important. For example, what a difference there is between revolutionary change and democratic change! There is also a difference—surely—between those who consider that applying *al-shar'iyah* [Islamic law] is the current pressing issue, and those who say that priority ought to be given to democracy and freedom. Applying *al-shar'iyah* if they are able to do so, surely is entering democracy's door and nothing else. This is the position which that trend has adopted, and which we believe has crystallized in recent years.

There is also a difference between Islamists who consider power to be the key to change, and others, such as those to whom we refer, who see in power one of the circles of change. Accordingly, it is a means—not a goal—for them. While the former talk about "enablement," the so-called political Islam preoccupying them, the latter are for reform and their priority is social and cultural Islam.

### Development in Islamic Thought, Jurisprudence

We do not want to continue without noting that recent years have witnessed an important idea developing in the program of certain Islamic groups. This development encompasses the field of *al-fiqh* [Islamic jurisprudence], and has also emerged in the intellectual field, inasmuch as it has gone beyond the idea of secret organization and encourages joining in democratic practices, such as participation in parliamentary elections, after an hiatus of more than 45 years.

That has also emerged in the Labor Party's program, in light of its Islamic leanings, since it has a positive position vis-a-vis issues of democracy, the rights of non-Muslims, and the participation of women in public life.

We should not fail to see here that we are noting what we consider to be a positive development in the thought of the Islamic movement in Egypt, as well as in several other countries of the Arab and Islamic world. That has been the position of the Islamic-oriented movement in



Tunisia since its establishment in the early seventies. (There were some questions and doubts about the acts of violence recently attributed to certain members of the movement, which is now called the Ennahdah Party). Despite our reservations concerning the efforts of the Islamic Front in Sudan vis-a-vis the problem of democracy and its favoring the idea of popular conferences, we must also note that, since the seventies, it has participated in parliamentary elections and has not been known to employ violent methods in its public activities.

No matter the extent of our intellectual differences with the Islamic movement in Jordan, we also note that—as a whole—it has accommodated moderation and has not hesitated to accept the rules of democratic practice. At the same time, the trend toward relative moderation in the Islamic movement is present, and actively practiced, in Pakistan, Malaysia, and to some extent, in Turkey.

That development in political thought was accompanied by a similar development in the *al-fiqh* underpinnings of several ongoing issues, so that we can say that the *al-fiqh* view of those issues has become different from what had been established and recognized in light of traditional *al-fiqh*. I pointed out something about that in a previous talk under the title "Regarding Progress in Islam," published on 12 December 1989. We will cite some of that article at this time:

"Traditional *al-fiqh* was considered *al-Khilafah* [associated with God's vicar on Earth], i.e., a system of jurisprudence instituted by Islam, so that some consider it 'religious,' which one is obligated to follow. The new interpretive position sees the *al-Khilafah* as historic and non-obligatory, and deduces that Islam has not defined a system or a specific form of jurisprudence. However, it was meant for the purpose of specific values which must be followed under the auspices of any form of justice that satisfies the people. In the forefront of those values are consultation, justice, freedom, and equality.

In the traditional position, it was decided that there was no partisanship in Islam, and that political plurality as a means for diversity was prohibited from being legitimized. The new interpretation considers that people have diverged from the traditions of God, and that plurality is required to expand the scope of consultation.

The traditional position considers consultation one of the recommended matters (*mandubat*), and that the ruler who took counsel was not under obligation. The new interpretation sees consultation as a duty first and an obligation ultimately, and the ruler is not allowed to ignore the consultation nor, after ascertaining the views, can he amend that which the advisors bring to him.

One of the fixtures of the traditional position is that the relationship between the Islamic state and its non-Muslim citizens is governed by the regulations of the well-known historic contract called *al-dhimmah* [covenant of protection between Muslim ruler and non-Muslim subjects]. The modern interpretation is that citizens, regardless of religion, are equal in rights and

obligations, except as pertains to religious matters, which concern people of each religion in accordance with the provisions of their religion. As for the *al-dhimmah*, it ended with the disappearance of its contracting parties and its justifications. It was followed by the problem of *jizyah* [head tax on free non-Muslims], which was an alternative to non-Muslim participation in the jihad with Muslims."

### New Islamic Trend

These are merely some examples of positive developments occurring in the field of political thought, and the growth of *al-fiqh*, but there is also another development that is no less important, since it involves the area of the silent and independent Islamic majority located outside the well-known groups and organizations.

It occurred to certain important members of that majority that they should formulate their views in a written text, whose first draft was done in December 1981, i.e., 10 years ago, before the world witnessed its massive changes in the wake of the declaration of perestroika in 1985.

Dr. Kamal Abu al-Majd was charged with drafting that viewpoint in a statement entitled "Toward a New Islamic Trend." I believe the statement was distributed, at that time, to about 150 Islamic specialists for more consultation on the principles and directions it contained. The content was discussed during lengthy debates among certain Egyptian Islamists concerned with this matter who were in Kuwait at that time.

Since 1981 and the declaration of the principles of the 'new Islamic trend,' it has been the object of intermittent discussion among Islamic circles in Egypt. A copy was also discussed with other, non-Islamic interested parties. The hope of those who prepared that statement was that it would be the nucleus of a distinguished Islamic entity that would adopt this new cultural and civilized viewpoint.

However, the political and legal climate prevented the birth of that hoped-for entity. The entire project has remained on the lists of things waited for.

There is no room here to review the statement's content, which took up 27 large-sized pages. But we will refer briefly to its highlights and to some of the principles that it asserted. First, the statement discusses points of departure, and then the comprehensive view required for change, as well as broad guidelines for reform—shifting to the need for national unity on the basis of full equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. It rejects the backward view of women, expressing the point that they must participate in the various activities of life. A section is devoted to general freedoms, stating that their establishment is a prerequisite for true progress. "One of the grave mistakes made by many of those who call for Islam, is that they present Islam to people in the form of a huge network of taboos and restrictions." The statement goes on to discuss the issue of the economic



structure, and concludes by renewing the position on the issue of Palestine and Arab unity.

That was a rough draft written 10 years ago. Many amendments and comments were made in response to it during the intermittent debates conducted throughout that period. However, despite that, it continues to be a testimony that the Islamic cup is not at all empty, as the writer of the letter which we referred to earlier, intimated. Apart from that, there is no misery, which Professor Salah Hafiz portrayed in his article published the Saturday before last, entitled "Program of the Islamists" (AKHBAR AL-YAWM, Saturday, 20 July 1991).

The latest news of the "new Islamic trend" project is that, after the failure suffered by attempts to bring it to life in our country, one of those who dreams of its birth carried it with him last week to the United States, where he will discuss the possibility of announcing its birth in one of the Islamic centers there.

#### **Yemen Releases Over 11,000 Egyptian Contract Teachers**

*91AA0560C Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic  
17 Jul 91 pp 1, 2*

[Article by Zaki al-Sa'dani: "Start of Steps to Disburse Dues of Teachers Returning from Yemen; Loaned Teachers Assigned to Egyptian Schools; Discussion Held on Completing Their Loan Years"]

[Text] Yemen has launched executive procedures to cancel the lending of 1,145 Egyptian teachers working in Yemeni elementary schools. The Yemeni Government has also decided to dispense with thousands of contract teachers, retaining only a small number of those who are specialized in certain areas. The number of contract teachers exceeds 11,000. Ahmad 'Abdallah, the Education Ministry's first undersecretary for services, has asserted that returning teachers whose loan [contract] has been canceled will go back to their old jobs in the ministry. He attributed the Yemeni decision to the difficult economic conditions Yemen is experiencing and to the trend toward relying on Yemeni citizens as teachers. It has been decided to enroll the children of the returning teachers in Egyptian schools without any restriction or conditions. The Egyptian official has asked all returning teachers to contact the Yemeni cultural attache in Cairo so that steps can be taken to disburse all their financial and in-kind dues from Yemen and to recoup the cash value of their return trip tickets to Sanaa. Teachers are entitled to get round-trip tickets to Sanaa from the cultural attache at the Yemeni Embassy so that they can settle all their affairs and interests in Yemen and have their children released from Yemeni schools and transferred to Egyptian schools. It has been decided to give returning teachers their jobs at Egyptian schools after the beginning of next September. Ahmad 'Abdallah has announced that executive measures are being taken to complete the loan years of the returned teachers.



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